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SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANY 
A first look into an emerging asset class
Purpose of the Study
This thesis presents the first empirical evidence on Special Purpose Acquisition 
Company (SPAC) as an asset class and studies its value creation ability from the 
investor perspective. SPAC is a public shell company that raises funds in an IPO for 
the purpose of seeking and acquiring a private company. After a target company is 
found, it is brought public by merging it with the SPAC in a reverse merger. To study 
the value creation ability of SPACs, the following research questions were 
formulated: i) Do abnormal returns for SPAC shareholders exist during the merger 
announcement and the merger completion events?, and ii) Can characteristics driving 
these returns be identified?
Data
The data sample used in this thesis consists of 152 SPACs listed in US exchanges 
during January 1st, 2003 — February 28th, 2008, and included in the Morgan Joseph 
Acquisition Company Index. Share prices, market index data, and trading volume 
data is retrieved from Thomson Datastream database. The data on the unique 
characteristics of SPACs is manually gathered from company filings in the SEC 
Edgar database.
Methodolog>'
This study utilizes event study methodology to examine abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns in the two expected events - merger announcement and 
merger completion - during a SPAC’s life cycle. In addition, multivariate regression 
is applied to determine the characteristics driving the abnormal returns.
Results
SPACs were found to destroy shareholder value after a merger by 4.33 % and by 
12.84 % over holding periods of 20 and 70 days respectively. These negative returns 
are found to be driven by agency problems between shareholders and underwriters of 
SPAC IPOs, and also by the dilution caused by the dual-class shares held by the 
management. Results also show that the percentage of IPO proceeds placed in a trust 
fund can be considered a proxy for the quality of the SPAC. Despite the negative 
returns shown, we find SPACs to be a feasible asset class, with the condition of 
sufficient investor sophistication and activity.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and motivation of the study
The year 2003 can be considered as the beginning of the modem era of blank check company 
(BCC) IPOs. While the idea of raising investment capital through an IPO first emerged in the 
70’s, lack of sound regulation and market conventions has hindered the formation of a 
functional market for these vehicles until recently.
The investor protection in Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) is drastically 
higher than in BCCs during their first emergence in late 70’s and later throughout the 80’s. 
During that era BCCs were opaque and often abused leaving investors exposed to fraudulent 
activities by parties involved in the market. Today BCCs have re-emerged as SPACs. The 
key difference to earlier BCCs is the voluntary compliance to most restrictions set forth by 
the Rule 419 amendment to the Securities Act of 1933. While SPACs specifically are not, in 
their current form, subject to any revised regulation since the 1980’s, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed regulation for similar asset classes has provided a 
solid base on which to build uniform market conventions. This worked for the benefit of both 
investors and promoters of SPACs as they appear to be catering to an existing demand. The 
improved investor protection has also resulted in increasing demand from hedge funds in 
particular and enabled a successful breakthrough to a mainstream asset class; during 2003- 
2007 the capital raised by SPAC IPOs in the US and UK totalled over 18 billion dollars 
making the SPAC market a noteworthy addition to the selection of publicly traded investment 
vehicles. Figure 1 shows the development of the combined US & UK SPAC market since the 
emergence of the current market in 2003.
This study draws its key motivation from the complete lack of published research on BCCs. 
Reaching approximately 19 % of total US IPO volume in 2007 *, the growing market has now 
enabled a sufficient sample size to expect drawing conclusions regarding the performance of
US IPO Volume in 2007: $65,149 million (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007 US IPO Watch)
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SPACs as a creator of value to the shareholders and to document how the market conventions 
are evolving and what the implications for investors are.
Figure 1. SPAC market development in 2003-2007
The figure presents the statistics for the combined US and UK SPAC market development in 2003-2007. The x- 
axis is the observation year. The left-hand side у-axis is the number of SPAC IPOs. The right-hand side у-axis is








SPAC IPO Volume (M) --------No. of SPAC IPOs
Source: SPAC Analytics
The aim of this study is to give an overview of SPACs as an asset class from the investor’s 
perspective. An event study on two events in a SPACs life cycle is performed as I will first 
focus on market reactions to the announcement of a merger agreement and then to the 
announcement of the completion of the merger.
As will be explained in greater detail later in this study, SPACs carry several features that 
distinguish them from standard equity instruments. These features warrant an investigation to 
as they clearly have great implications on the behaviour of the SPAC share price. 
Understanding these features allows for more sophisticated investing in SPACs and enables 
investors to avoid the disadvantages that may arise from SPAC structures.
I study a sample of US listed SPACs included in the Morgan Joseph Acquisition Company 
Index (MJACI). Companies in the sample are listed on either the Pink Sheets О ГС Markets 
or the American Stock Exchange (Amex). The sample data consists of the daily returns of
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these companies during the announcements of two expected event windows in a SPAC s life 
cycle - the merger announcement and the merger completion.
1.2. Research problem and limitations
This study aims to examine SPAC share prices and daily returns to test for the existence of 
abnormal returns during the event windows of the two events, the merger announcement and 
the merger completion. A secondary objective of this study is to test for the value creation 
ability of SPAC as an asset class
In order to achieve these goals, the following research problems are formulated:
7. Do abnormal returns for SPAC shareholders exist
a. During a merger announcement?
b. During a merger completion?
11. Which SPAC characteristics drive the share price performance and how relevant 
are they in explaining the returns to SPAC shareholders
The main focus of this study is on the abnormal returns during the merger announcement and 
the merger completion events. As a side note, this study also acts as a first document into 
how the SPAC market conventions are evolving.
The main limitation of the study is the young age of the market. While the sample includes a 
total of 152 companies, a large portion of them are formed in 2007 and have not completed 
their life cycle by consummating a business combination or by being liquidated. This means 
that sample sizes for the studied events are smaller than the whole sample 152 observations. 
Further restricting the sample size is the availability of share price data, which can partially 
be attributed to the IPO format of unit offering. The final sample sizes for the two events 
stand at 74 for the merger announcement and 38 for the merger completion. In addition, 11 
SPACs have been liquidated, but as the trading usually is halted shortly after the 
announcement of the disapproved merger, these liquidated SPACs can only be used to 
control results in the merger agreement announcement event.
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1.3. Previous research and contribution
BCCs have currently not been the subject of any published research. As a first look into 
SPACs, this thesis employs several well established theories to examine how SPACs conform 
to the traditional finance theories and what the implications for investors are.
Previous research on blank check companies can be found in an unpublished working paper 
by Jog and Sun (2007), who find blank check IPOs to yield massive 1900% returns to the 
management teams2. Underpricing of blank check IPOs is found to be only 1.9 % on average, 
which is insignificant compared to the average underpricing documented in earlier studies 
(see, e.g. Hansen, 2000). Mean and median underwriter’s fee in blank check IPOs is found to 
be approximately the industry standard 7 % for mid-sized IPOs. As Jog and Sun have 
documented, the underpricing aspects of blank check companies, I have chosen to neglect 
that aspect in my study. Partial reason for this decision is also the poor availability of 
immediate post-IPO share price (or unit price) data for unit offerings that trade only as a unit.
SPACs are also mentioned in detail by Sjöström (2006) who makes a point to emphasize that 
SPACs are very different from a standard reverse merger as a means to go public and should 
not be evaluated as one.
This thesis contributes to existing research in several ways. First, it is the first study to 
document the developments of SPAC market conventions. Second, this thesis adds to the 
understanding of SPACs’ ability to create shareholder value and highlights conflicts that 
affect this ability. Third area of contribution is the first analysis of SPAC characteristics and 
their relevance to the share price performance. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this 
thesis lays ground for a wide array of future research on SPACs.
1.4. Definitions of key concepts
This section briefly defines the key concepts of this study.
2 It is worth noting that the median investment from the management is $25,000
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Blank check company (BCC) A publicly listed shell company that has no cash-flow 
generating operations and is primarily used in reverse mergers.
Blank check IPO The general concept of fundraising through an IPO with the goal of 
finding a target company to complete a reverse merger with.
Reverse merger (also: reverse takeover) An alternative way of going public. In a reverse 
merger a company mergers with a blank check (or shell) company and gains its public status. 
Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) A vehicle used for a blank check IPO that 
voluntarily complies with various restrictions to increase transparency and investor protection
1.5. Structure of the study
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the SPAC as an asset 
class, including a brief look on history and legislation. Section 3 summarizes the literature 
relevant to this thesis. Section 4 presents the hypotheses of the study and Section 5 describes 
the data sample and its properties. Section 5 describes data and the methodologies employed 
in this study. In Section 6 we document and analyze the results of the study and finally 
Section 8 summarizes my findings and concludes the thesis.
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2. Special Purpose Acquisition Company - A brief overview
This section first defines SPAC, then summarizes the history of and legislation relevant to 
blank check companies. Finally the structure and process of a SPAC is described and key 
advantages and disadvantages are identified.
2.1. What are Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
SPAC is not an asset class officially defined by any regulatory body. SPAC is an investment 
vehicle designed to meet market demand by voluntarily complying to restrictions imposed on 
smaller blank check companies. This thesis defines SPAC as
"a blank check company raising funds via an unit IPO and voluntarily complying with 
restrictions similar to those imposed by SEC Rule 419. ”
Blank check companies are defined by SEC as
"... a development stage company that has no specific business plan or purpose or has 
indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified 
company or companies, other entity, or person. These very small companies typically involve 
speculative investments and often fall within the SEC ’s definition of 'penny stocks or are 
considered ’microcap stocks. 4,3
SPAC is a special purpose vehicle designed to give public investors access to private 
markets, which typically are available only to private equity funds. SPAC is a so called blank 
check company as it has no operations, but it does not fall under the penny stock category 
due to its larger market capitalization and higher share price.
This empty shell company is taken public in an IPO by a management team with the sole aim 
of merging with or acquiring a private company using the proceeds from the IPO and
3 http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm, retrieved February 22nd, 2008
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optional debt financing. Stock financed deals are also possible. The merger with the target 
company is a reverse merger, which is an alternative way of going public typically connected 
to smaller companies (see, e.g. Gleason et ah, 2006). SPAC also falls in the category often 
referred to as “blind investment pools”, which is a common expression for vehicles, such as 
private equity funds, where the investor is not aware of the eventual use of the funds 
invested. Common to all blind pool investments is that the associated risk is heavily 
dependent on the persons involved, making management track record a crucial element in 
evaluating the investment.
SPACs carry a pre-defined fixed liquidation date by which they must complete an acquisition 
or the company will be dissolved. Most of the proceeds from the IPO are placed in a trust 
fund until the consummation of a target business. If no merger takes place, the funds from the 
trust are returned to investors on a pro-rata basis.
2.2. A Brief History of blank check companies
During the 1980’s blank check IPOs experienced their first hot issue period. However, this 
period was tainted by frauds and abuses that eventually led to diminishing of investor interest 
and trust, as well as the whole the market for blank check IPOs. During this era blank check 
IPOs were small and fell under the penny stock category.
In 1980’s BCCs were used several times in a microcap stock fraud - a scheme where a penny 
stock share price is inflated and the stock is then sold to the public. The case of Hughes 
Capital Corporation (HCC) is widely regarded as the most notorious blank check fraud in 
history. In 1985 HCC raised $650,000 in a public offering and bought shares of in overpriced 
penny stock extensively owned by the HCC management.
The HCC incident eventually led to the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 and the Rule 419 
amendment to the Securities Act of 1933, which helped to pave way for formation of SPACs 
today.
7
2.3. Overview of relevant legislation
SEC is the governing body for US SPACs. After a period of loose legislation on BCCs in the 
1980’s, several new regulations have been introduced. These laws have had a profound effect 
on the development of blank check IPOs into SPACs. The following sections describe these 
regulations and their effect on the evolution of blank check IPOs to SPACs.
2.3.1. The Penny Stock Reform Act
In 1990 the US Congress passed the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (PSRA). PSRA 
authorized SEC to regulate the promoters of penny stock IPOs and set requirements for 
greater transparency in penny stock offerings greatly increasing the costs of listing such a
company.
The real effect, however, remained superficial as penny stock companies circumvented the 
act by increasing their share or unit offer prices beyond the penny stock definition of $5. A 
feature also present in SPACs today as typical prices for the units offered range between $6 
and $10. In the immediate post-PSRA period the abnormal returns of companies priced over 
$5 (i.e. non-penny stock companies) declined as did the number of IPOs in the penny stock 
category. The problem of issuer quality was not solved, but was spread out beyond the penny 
stock category. (Beatty and Kadiyala, 2003)
PSRA’s main legacy regarding SPACs is the price of units issued in the IPO, which is 
typically set at $6, $8 or $10.
2.3.2. Rule 419
First piece of regulation applying specifically to blank check IPOs was the Rule 419 
amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 introduced in 1992. Although Rule 419 does not 
apply to SPACs but focuses solely on blank check IPOs in the penny stock category, it has 
played a crucial role in the revival of the market for blank check IPOs. SPACs comply with 
most restrictions set forth by Rule 419 by market convention.
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Rule 419 restricts blank check companies in five ways. First, Rule 419 states that 90 % of the 
funds raised in an offering by a blank check company must be placed on a third party escrow 
account until used in the expected merger or until the vehicle is liquidated, in which case the 
funds are returned to the investors. Second, Rule 419 stipulates that the net assets to be 
acquired must be valued at a minimum of 80 % of the IPO proceeds. Third restriction is an 
18-month (plus the six-month extension period) limit for the acquisition. If the company is 
unable to complete or at least initiate a merger during this period, the company is liquidated 
and funds in the escrow will be returned to the investors along with any interest accrued. 
Fourth restriction increasing investor protection is the requirement of shareholder approval of 
80% for the merger proposed by the management. Fifth restriction is that the pre-merger 
trading of blank check company shares is prohibited. This is the only restriction SPACs do 
not conform to in any form.
In practice the restrictions mean that 85-100% of the net proceeds from SPAC IPOs are 
placed in a trust fund investing in T-bills and accrue interest until the SPAC is liquidated or 
the acquisition is completed. When the management announces that it has entered into a 
merger agreement with a target company, a shareholder meeting is scheduled to carry out a 
voting process to approve the proposed merger. Without the approval the merger is 
withdrawn and the company moves to liquidation process.
Rule 419 applies on blank check companies trading at a share price of $5 or below and 
having net assets of less than $5 million (i.e. penny stocks). SPACs listed in 2003 or later do 
not fulfil either requirement and are therefore not legally bound to abide by Rule 419. 
However, SPACs voluntarily comply to restrictions similar to Rule 419 to increase their 
appeal to investors. As Rule 419 prohibits trading of securities issued under it, the current 
market convention of voluntary compliance is a way to achieve similar investor protection 
while maintaining secondary markets for blank check companies. Due to the voluntary nature 
of the self-imposed restrictions, SPACs are free to adjust the specifics of the restrictions in 
future issues. Current market conventions have evolved towards lower required shareholder 
approval level for the merger proposals and higher share of IPO proceeds to be placed in 
escrow4.
4 See Chapter 6 for details
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2.3.3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Arguably the most drastic increase in the regulation of public companies in the US was the 
introduction of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, 
or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). In the wake of major accounting scandals in late 1990’s 
and beginning of the following decade, SOX was introduced in 2002 to increase transparency 
and improve corporate governance practises in public companies. SOX has received harsh 
criticism for its high costs especially on smaller firms and many studies show the adverse 
effects of SOX on the number of new IPOs and increased level de-listings immediately after 
SOX took effect (see e.g. Asbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Carney, 2007).
Hiev (2007) shows that valuations of smaller public companies decreased after SOX came to 
effect mainly due to lower earnings caused by increased accounting costs.
On the positive side, Brau and Fawcett (2006) find some support in their partially interview 
based study for the notion that private companies do not see the increased liabilities of 
officers imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley as an impediment to going public. Also, companies 
listed on Pink Sheets OTC Markets or other OTC exchanges are not required to be SOX 
compliant. However, emphasis must be placed on the fact that SPACs in the US typically 
move to more liquid markets after completing a merger and must then eventually comply to
SOX.
In conclusion, SOX has had a severely degrading effect on companies’ willingness to go or 
stay public and has decreased the valuations of public companies. It is evident that challenges 
for vehicles such as SPACs or venture capital funds that aspire to list their portfolio 
companies, are much greater than in the pre-SOX era.
2.4. Structure and process
The following sections chronologically take the reader through the formation of a SPAC and 
describe the process leading up to the eventual acquisition or liquidation.
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2.4.1. Pre-IPO period - Formation of the company
A SPAC is initially a newly formed development stage company with capital invested from 
the management team leading the SPAC and possible third party financial sponsors (original 
shareholders). Original shareholders typically invest $25,000 in exchange for what is 
equivalent to a 20 % ownership after the IPO. The size of the original shareholder’s 
investment appears to be independent of the SPAC target size (IPO gross proceeds) and can 
be considered as a formality.
2.4.2. Initial public offering
American SPACs are typically listed on OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB), Pink Sheets OTC 
Markets or American Stock Exchange. Smaller exchanges are preferred due to looser 
regulation and subsequently cheaper administrative costs. Recent trends are taking SPAC 
IPOs also to New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ3. European SPACs have been listed 
on Alternative Investment Market of London Stock Exchange and NYSE Euronext. The 
choice of market place is typically driven by regulatory cost issues.
SPACs are offered in units traditionally consisting of a common share and one or two 
warrants. These units are usually priced at $6, $8 or $10. The warrants start trading separately 
from the shares after a pre-defined period. Management typically also agrees to purchase 
warrants at the strike price in a private placement a year after the IPO to provide liquidity. 
Unit IPOs are typically associated with less prestigious underwriter’s (Schulz, 1993). 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) show evidence that firms with more intrinsic risk are more 
likely to choose unit IPOs over standard equity IPOs. Schultz (1993) also presents the 
agency-cost hypothesis, which states that a unit IPO “provides management incentives to 
prove a project’s value before obtaining a second round of financing”.
The management team and possible financial sponsors typically retain 20% of the shares at 
the IPO with only a marginal amount of capital invested in the SPAC. However, the original 
shareholders are not entitled to any funds in the event of liquidation as all assets (net of
5 http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080306/nyse-moves-to-allow-spac-listings.htm
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possible small liabilities) in trust fund or owned by the SPAC are returned to investors 
holding shares issued in the IPO.
Underwriters of the IPO charge a median underwriter’s fee of 7 % as has become the market 
convention in all medium-sized US IPOs (see e.g., Chen and Ritter, 2000; Hansen, 2001). 
However, SPAC underwriters typically agree to defer a portion of the fee until a merger has 
been completed. This deferral includes also waiving rights to the interest accrued on the 
deferred funds from the pre-acquisition period. The payment of the deferred portion is 
contingent on the completion of a merger. Contingent fee structures have received some 
attention in the academia. Rau (2000) finds that the size of the fee contingent on completing a 
M&A is positively correlated with the market share and number of deals advised by the bank 
and that there is significant evidence of negative correlation between the acquirer’s post­
acquisition share price performance and the contingent fees charged. Rau (2000) concludes 
that contingent fees are suited to align the interests of the advisor and the acquirer to 
complete a tender offer, but also that banks behaviour is opportunistic and not in line with the 
long term interests of the acquirer shareholders. The usage of fees based on meeting certain 
criteria has also been thoroughly studied in the legal realm where lawyers’ efforts are often 
tied to the outcome of the court’s ruling. McKee et al. (2007) present that an equilibrium 
contingent fee may exist to optimize agency costs and improve the expected value of the 
outcome, but require sufficient sophistication on behalf of both parties involved.
2.4.3. Post-IPO period - Seeking target companies
SPACs seeking acquisition targets are quite illiquid and among the least traded equities on 
any exchange. However, in comparison to private equity, this limited liquidity still provides 
an additional method to exit the investment and allows investors to use more dynamic exit 
strategies. The illiquidity of a security carries some implications regarding the future 
development of its price. Several studies (see, e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1989; Amihud, 
2002; Lemer and Schoar, 2004) show that illiquid securities carry a discount and therefore 
experience higher abnormal returns at the time of positive news as the discount shrinks.
SPAC managers typically do not allocate their full time in seeking acquisitions but have 
limited their duty to even as low as only 10 hours a week. However, aligning management
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and underwriter interests with a deferred underwriter’s fee also harnesses the underwriter to 
assist in the search of an acquisition target (Rau, 2000).
The pre-merger trading of SPAC shares has been documented to experience some anomalies, 
namely the discounted price of the shares relative to the net asset value (NAV) presented by 
the value of funds placed in the trust fund. These anomalies can be viewed from the 
framework of closed-end fund valuation as both SPACs and closed-end funds share 
similarities in vehicle characteristics and typical share price development. Closed-end funds 
are typically found trading at prices below the net asset value of the vehicle. This 
phenomenon is part of the closed-end fund discount puzzle6 and has been studied extensively, 
but arguably not conclusively (see e.g., Zweig, 1973; Delong et ah, 1990; Lee et ah, 1991). 
The puzzle has been partly explained by agency costs, illiquidity, taxation and investor 
sentiments. The agency costs explanation is first introduced by Boudreux (1973) who 
proposed that discounts may result from high management fees or subpar expected portfolio 
management. However, aspects of the agency costs explanation has been disputed by various 
studies (see e.g., Malkiel, 1977; Lee et al., 1991) and are not accepted as a relevant 
explanation to the puzzle. Portfolio asset illiquidity, on the other hand, has received 
acceptance as carrying some credit in explaining the discount (Malkiel, 1977; Lee et al., 
1991), but failing under closer scrutiny to explain the fluctuations in the level of discount. 
Capital gains taxation argument has received contrary evidence from Brauer (1984) and 
Brickley and Schallheim (1985) who present evidence that the dynamics of a closed-end 
fund’s share price development in the event of conversion to an open-ended form are that of 
rising share prices matching NAV instead of NAV depreciating to the level of the share price. 
Changing investor sentiments is the single most acceptable explanation the closed-end fund 
puzzle (Lee et al., 1991).
Although SPACs differ greatly from closed-end funds as investment vehicles, some parallels 
can be drawn between the SPAC merger completion and the open-ending of a closed-end 
fund. Based on evidence from closed end-funds it is expected that SPAC share price also 
exhibits similar behaviour in the merger completion event.
6 The closed-end fund discount puzzle consists of four aspects: (i) discount share price, (ii) fluctuation of the discount level, (iii) positive 
abnormal returns when closed-end fund is convert to open-ended and (iv) the reason why the funds initially get started.
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2.4.4. Merger agreement and shareholder vote
When a target company is found a letter of intent to merge is signed and announcement of 
this agreement is made. Voting schedule and instructions for the shareholders is will also be 
decided at this time. The date for the special shareholder meeting where the voting takes 
place is typically set 4-12 months after the announcement to allow for a road show to market 
the proposed target company to current and potential shareholders. During the period leading 
to the shareholder’s meeting details of the transaction are agreed upon and all preparations 
made to allow for completion of the merger just days after SPAC shareholders have approved 
it.
Shareholders choosing to vote against the merger are entitled to convert their shares to cash 
by liquidating their pro-rata share of the funds in the escrow account including any accrued 
interest. If the number of shareholders converting their ownership exceeds the set threshold, 
the proposed merger is abandoned and the SPAC moves to the liquidation process.
2.4.5. Merger
If the required level of shareholder approval is met, the proposed merger proceeds as 
prepared. An official announcement of merger approval is made immediately following the 
shareholder’s meeting. The merger taking place is a reverse merger where the existing 
shareholders of the target company are paid new shares of the SPAC, cash or a combination 
of the two. The resulting entity is a public company with operations of the acquired target and 
a shareholder base depending on the fraction acquired. The finalisation of a merger is 
dependent only on relevant filings and transactions and is completed typically within 2-3 
days of the shareholder vote.
Reverse mergers have been studied very little, but the general consensus in the academia as 
well as in business world is that reverse mergers are a “back door” for going public. 
Typically a reverse merger is carried out with a small shell company and allows the registrant 
to escape various listing requirements, which is why higher quality companies typically do 
not consider reverse mergers as feasible alternatives and choose to go public via an IPO 
(Bayar and Chemmanur, 2006; Gleason et al., 2006). The argument presented for reverse
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mergers is that they allow smaller companies to cheaply gain public status and thus access 
public equity markets. However, one must note that a reverse merger by definition does not 
include additional financing for the company. Arellano-Ostoa and Brusco (2002) show in 
their unpublished working paper that an IPO and a reverse merger with a seasoned equity 
offering are approximately of equal cost, but emphasize that companies choosing reverse 
mergers are not likely to subsequently raise capital. Sjöström (2006) argues that reverse 
mergers serve primarily the purpose of allowing small companies to access PIPE financing.
2.5. Issues to consider
This section describes the advantages and disadvantages for investors and target companies 
involved in a SPAC IPO or merger.
2.5.1. Advantages for investors
SPACs combine several features that help explain the demand for SPACs. The combination 
of access to private markets, limited downside and the existence of secondary market make 
SPACs a unique vehicle in the financial markets. As an investment vehicle, SPAC 
fundraising via an IPO is a quicker process than private equity fundraising, allowing for a 
swift turnover of invested funds.
SPACs allow investors to invest in a private sector companies just like private equity funds, 
but offer several advantages over private equity. These advantages include greater 
transparency due to SEC regulation, a clearly defined and low maximum risk due to 
mimicking the Rule 419 compliant use of an escrow account, and a relatively short 
investment period, that can even be aborted by selling the shares on the exchange or choosing 
to convert them at the time of shareholder voting on the proposed merger.
Further advantages stem from corporate governance issues as private sector compames are 
often owned by a low number of shareholders. When such companies are taken public the 
original ownership base often results in blockholders owning a relatively large share of the 
public company’s shares. These blockholders then increase the level of shareholder control in 
the company and improve corporate governance practises. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986)
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2.5.2. Advantages for target companies
Solid markets for SPACs could not exist unless SPACs also offers benefits to target company 
shareholders and managers. SPAC’s key target profile is companies looking to go public in 
near future or at least open to the possibility. Alternatives to going public first include the 
choice of an IPO or an acquisition by an already public entity.
Assuming that the target company is not willing to merge with another operating entity, 
SPACs offer a way to carry out a reverse merger, but also gain benefits of funds raised in the 
SPAC IPO. Plain reverse mergers are typically only a way to change to a public status, but 
very little capital changes hands in these transactions. Arellano-Ostoa and Brusco (2002) 
show that standard reverse mergers and IPOs are equal in cost when taking into account the 
lack of additional funding in reverse mergers.
Based on the issues presented above, going public through a reverse merger with a SPAC 
may offer a feasible solution to both the shareholders of the SPAC and the target company. 
Assuming that the future public status of the target enables SPAC to value the target beyond 
what financial acquirers in the private sector are able to. If this valuation remains below the 
expected premium from the newly acquired public status, the scenario is a presents a 
potential win-win situation for the shareholders of both companies.
SPAC is also a feasible vehicle for the target company to undergo a reverse merger with as it 
is a clean shell without hidden liabilities. Compared to standard reverse mergers, merging 
with a SPAC does not carry a similar reputation risk as SPAC is a legitimate financial
acquirer.
2.5.3. Disadvantages for investors
Disadvantages inherent in SPACs are distinct and identifiable. However, the implications for 
investors are less obvious and make SPAC valuation a difficult task. The inherent dilution 
from original shareholders, the difficulty of evaluating management competence beforehand,
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competition with private equity, and finally a lemons problem may also arise due to target 
companies’ preferences of route to going public.
Management and the financial sponsors of the SPAC typically invest as little as 2 cents per 
share, but retain an ownership of 20 % in the company (Jog and Sun, working paper, 2007). 
This results in a respective dilution when a merger is approved and all shares start trading on 
equal basis.
Like private equity, SPACs rely heavily on the competence of the management team. SPAC 
management uses their connections and industry knowledge to identify potential acquisition 
targets. Competence in this process is difficult for investors assess. In addition, 
management’s duty to work for the SPAC is usually a very limited time per week, decreasing 
management’s expected effort for finding a target.
Competition with private equity is a crucial element to account for. Especially LBO funds in 
the small and mid-sized bracket compete for target companies with SPACs, although the 
target profile slightly varies between the two: SPACs aspire to merge with target companies 
that can be acquired at a discount and are willing to immediately go public. Buyout funds’ 
key focus is finding companies that benefit from restructuring to increase value (Nadant et 
al., 2006). Competitive and well established private equity markets decrease the probability 
of finding and closing mergers with high quality targets.
Another problem regarding high quality target companies is their preference to go public via 
an IPO (Bayar and Chemmanur, 2006). This creates potential for a lemons problem in a 
market where top companies go public themselves or are acquired by well-established private 
equity funds.
Information asymmetries are also a problem during SPACs existence. For example, Pink 
Sheets OTC Markets do not require companies to be reporting of insider trading, unlike 
OTCBB and larger exchanges. And even after completing a merger the asymmetries remain 
high due to the lack of analyst coverage on the new public entity and its operations.
SPACs have started out as niche vehicles and this is also reflected on the quality of the 
promoters. SPAC IPOs are often underwritten by smaller banks that may lack the
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connections and clientele to market the SPAC and assure investor attention in the post­
merger period. This relates also to the problems arising from of lacking analyst coverage 
mentioned in the next section.
Finally it must be noted that investing in SPACs requires eventually an active role when the 
management team presents their proposed merger deal. To successfully invest in SPACs 
requires research on the proposed merger. Screening the investments which to approve 
requires resources, but passive investment strategy leads to worse returns. The option for an 
individual investor to convert her shares into cash is a highly valuable privilege and should 
not be ignored.
2.5.4. Disadvantages for Target Companies
Disadvantages for target companies are few. A company willing to go public should find 
little difference to alternatives after a merger with a SPAC. Consistent with Bayar and 
Chemmanur (2006), SPACs have been experiencing volatile post-IPO share price 
performance, which has received some critique in media and among investors. Reverse 
mergers in general result in listed companies that lack analyst coverage. This further 
increases the information asymmetries among investors.
However, after a company has established its public status and gained analyst coverage, the 
fact that it merged with a SPAC to become publicly listed bears little consequence.
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3. Review of relevant literature
Blank check companies have so far been neglected in the academia, and no studies focusing 
on blank check companies have been published7. The following sections include a brief 
review of literature relevant to SPACs.
3.1. Theories on value creation
SPACs are financial acquirers and, as such, are in the business of creating value through 
screening of potential acquisition targets and closing deals with advantageous terms. 
Neoclassical — or value creation — theory sees acquisitions as value-enhancing activities 
where managers work to maximize stockholder wealth. This value creation may arise from 
various sources, such as cost cutting or corporate restructuring. However, most of the existing 
literature focuses on how strategic acquirers can create value. On the other hand, studies on 
financial acquirers have mostly focused on private equity funds. Investments by private 
equity differ from those of SPACs in a crucial way: private equity funds not only invest 
capital, but also human resources. Private equity funds thus actively pursue value creation 
methods while owning the company. SPACs, on the other hand, are fairly limited in their 
selection of value creation methods as the deal is a one-off type investment implying that the 
value must be created within the terms of the merger.
Neoclassical theories propose several ways of value creation. These include efficiency 
improvements (Weston et al., 2001), increased operational synergies (see e.g. Weston et ah, 
1998), financial synergies (Myers and Majluf, 1984), strategic realignments (Copeland and 
Weston, 1988), undervaluation, asymmetric information (Bradley et ah, 1983), and 
diversification. The following sections focus on literature regarding value creation methods 
feasible for SPACs.




The undervaluation theory originates from the assumption of inefficient markets. 
Acquisitions are made where the market value of a company does not reflect its true intrinsic 
value. A low q-ratio is regarded as an implication of undervaluation. Q-ratio is defined as the 
ratio of the market value of a company to the replacement cost of its assets. A company with 
a low q-ratio is an attractive target for a takeover as it can be acquired at a lower cost 
compared to other means of developing similar assets. The q-ratio is typically regarded as a 
sign of company’s growth opportunities and/or goodwill.
Problem with undervaluation from SPAC’s perspective is that they focus on private 
companies which do not have a quoted market value. Private companies are difficult to value 
due to lack of transparency required from public companies. This presents a dilemma for 
SPAC management as the resulting scenarios are that either a competing acquirer is targeting 
the same company, which pushes the price up and reduces acquirer returns (see, e.g. Bradley 
et al., 1988) , or the management and shareholders of the target company find the offer 
reasonably priced. This situation leads us directly to the winner’s curse (see, e.g. Thaler, 
1988) which refers to the phenomenon where the “winning” or accepted bid is the one most 
likely to overvalue the goods or assets for sale.
To understand how challenging value creation with is even with a full arsenal of tools at 
disposal, we can look at Sirower (1997) who summarized the results of ten empirical studies 
documenting the “value-destructive effects of acquisitions to the shareholders of acquirers”. 
Event window was restricted to the announcement period and the negative abnormal returns 
for acquiring companies range from -3.35 % to -0.8 %. On average, only 35 % of the merger 
announcements were met with positive return performance. These results seem to contradict 
the findings by Jensen and Ruback (1983) where immediate returns were positive for the 
acquirer. Most of the studies quoted by Sirower (1997) focus on the M&As completed in the 
1980’s whereas Jensen and Ruback (1983) focus is on mergers in the 70’s. To show that 
M&A performance is getting worse, Sirower (1997) quotes four different studies indicating 
that returns to acquirers were in fact lower in the 80’s than they were in the 70 s. Which, in 
turn, were lower than bidder returns in the 60’s.
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3.1.2. Asymmetrie information
Over time, a myriad of studies have shown that takeovers of publicly traded targets are value 
neutral at best, although likely to destroy bidder shareholder value. However, contrary 
evidence from studies focusing on acquisitions of privately held targets has been documented 
in the past ten years (see, e.g. Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006). Rationale 
for the positive returns to bidders targeting private targets has been given several 
explanations. Part of the effect is credited to the presence of blockholders who improve 
shareholder control in the company (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), but also give a 
positive signal by keeping a large position in the company yet being well-informed (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977; Chang, 1998). Another view on the issue comes from Bayar and Chemmanur 
(2006) who examine the choices of going public in the context of partially exiting venture 
capitalist. In their theoretical paper Bayar and Chemmanur (2006) propose that while an IPO 
would yield higher returns a company might choose to be acquired at a lower price due to 
benefits arising from synergies in certain product market related scenarios. It can be argued 
that markets perceive that a public acquirer has gained the “listing premium' while paying a 
premium-free price for the target assets. Bayar (2006) set out to find empirical evidence on 
the implications of the framework presented by Bayar and Chemmanur (2006) and finds the 
premium to disappear for deals over $50 million in size and in general diminish over time. 
Brau et al. (2003) propose that the premium may actually be a liquidity discount: merging 
with an established public entity allows for better liquidity than being listed as a new public 
company. As a final explanation, Bayar and Chemmanur present that the entrepreneur may 
choose to be acquired as information asymmetries among IPO investors are large and cause 
fluctuating share prices. This presents a risk for the share price to sink below the price offered 
in the M&A deal before a possible lockup period is over.
3.1.3. Corporate governance
As suggested in previous section, SPACs have some means to extract value from improving 
control over management. In addition to the aforementioned blockholders, who mostly create 
value relative to other public companies, SPACs can also employ debt financing to acquire 
the target, thus increasing its leverage. Increasing the leverage of a company has been shown 
to reduce possible agency problems between management and shareholders. This effect is
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referred to as free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). The agency problem in this context 
arises when management is not entitled to the full amount of residual claim a company 
creates and, instead of focusing on value creating activities, are tempted to invest less effort 
in managing the company and more in consummation of perquisites, empire building and 
other value destroying activities. Increasing the level of debt in a company reduces the free 
cash flow the company generates, thus decreasing management’s opportunities to squander it 
in value destroying activities. Debt can thus be seen as a tool to improve control over 
management.
Agency problems and other challenges found in SPACs are discussed in section 3.2.
3.1.4. Method of payment
Closely related to the topics of debt and information asymmetries is the question of 
acquisition currency, i.e. choosing between cash or stock. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue 
that the acquirer prefers cash if the management believes their stock is undervalued. From 
these propositions arises the signalling hypothesis, which states that using cash to finance the 
acquisition implies that management’s perceives that their stock is undervalued. It follows 
that using company’s stock to pay the target signals undervaluation. The signalling 
hypothesis has received support from several studies such as Huang and Walkling (1987), 
Travlos (1987), and Loughran and Vijh (1997) who all find higher returns for both bidder and 
target when acquisition is financed with cash rather than stock. Part of the superior 
performance of cash deals, however, is attributed to the benefits of debt. Maloney et al. 
(1993) find in their analysis of leverage and announcement-period returns to acquirers that 
returns to acquirers are positively correlated with the pre-acquisition level of debt and post­
acquisition changes in leverage. Their findings are consistent with Jensen s (1986) free cash 
flow hypothesis which proposes that debt can be used as a control mechanism on the 
management, thus improving corporate governance practises in the company.
In acquisitions of privately held targets, Chang (1998) finds stock deals to result in positive 
reactions in acquirer’s share price. Several other studies (see, e.g. Travlos, 1987) document 
the exact opposite for acquirers of public companies. The negative reaction for acquisitions 
of public targets is typically perceived as the inverse of the signalling hypothesis presented 
earlier regarding cash deals; stock is used when management believes it is overvalued. Thus,
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markets correct their valuations downwards at times of announced stock deals. The 
explanations to positive reactions for acquirers of private targets were already discussed in 
section 3.1.2, but the matter of payment method is yet to be touched on the issue. Officer et 
al. (2007) show in their unpublished working paper that acquirers using stock as the 
acquisition currency are rewarded “when the target’s assets and operations are difficult to 
value”. This is consistent with Hansen’s (1987) model of bargaining under asymmetric 
information.
However, as non-operating financial acquirers SPACs have very little to signal in the first 
place. The method of payment is still a relevant issue not only due to the free cash flow 
hypothesis and use of debt, but also because the use of stock helps the acquirer to share the 
risk of overvaluation with the target company owners (Hansen, 1987). SPAC shares have a 
distinct intrinsic value as they represent a claim to what is essentially a trust fund, thus 
escaping the problem of valuing the share price fairly in negotiations with the target 
company.
3.2. Challenges faced by SPACs
3.2.1. Agency problems
Agency theory refers to the conflict of interest between the agent and the principal. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) present two categories of conflicts found in companies; conflicts 
between shareholders and management and conflicts between shareholders and debt holders. 
Agency theory proposes that solution to the conflicts between shareholders and managers can 
be solved by increasing level of debt in the company. As discussed in previous section, debt 
is a viable tool to improve target company efficiency.
However, SPACs themselves are also subject to multiple sources of agency problems. The 
most obvious problem arises from the financial position of the management. Management 
stands to lose not only their tiny investment, but also the ownership in SPAC in case of 
liquidation. The limited timeframe in which to complete a merger is a prime source for an 
agency problem. As SPAC approaches the liquidation date the management has an incentive 
to propose any merger deal to the shareholders as it would still yield positive returns to 
management’s original investment. Another source of an agency problem arises from a
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similar situation. Due to the practise of deferring a portion of underwriter’s fee, the 
underwriter also has an incentive to see a merger take place. As shown by Rau (2000), the 
underwriters play a role in finding target companies if a contingent fee is employed. This 
implies that also the underwriters have an incentive to have the SPAC complete any merger 
regardless of the deal quality. SPACs have artificially countered these problems with the 
Rule 419 compliant use of higher shareholder approval for the merger proposed by the 
management, which, in turn, has opened a door for activist funds to extract benefits with 
relatively low level of ownership.
3.2.2. Winner’s curse
Bradley et al. (1988) studied the multiple bidders scenario and find that the net effect of a 
bidding contest is decreased returns to acquirer shareholders. In the single bidder scenario the 
abnormal returns were positive at 2.8 %, while the returns to the acquirers in the multiple- 
bidder cases averaged at -0.7%. Evidence consistent with Bradley et al. (1988) is found in 
e.g. Servaes (1991) and Datta et al. (1992).
The evidence implies that as more bidders target the same company, the probability of falling 
victim to winner’s curse increases. SPACs by definition are in competitions with private 
equity funds as they both target privately held companies. Although a SPAC is unlikely to 
participate in a bidding contest on a single target, competing acquirers targeting companies 
with similar profiles are likely to decrease SPAC shareholder value.
The threat of winner’s curse not only arises from the competition, but also from the target 
companies. Bayar and Chemmanur (2006) argue that companies of higher quality prefer 
going public via an IPO to gain sufficient underwriter support in creating liquidity. Brau et. 
al. (2003) address this decision making process and find that decision to undergo an IPO is 
more likely under macroeconomic conditions such as high cost of debt and “hot” IPO market, 
whereas less active IPO periods often yield lower valuations, thus appearing less enticing for 
companies to go public via an IPO. The factors affecting a private company’s decision to go 
public are of immense relevance to investors in SPACs as they also allow for evaluation of 
the current operating environment: conditions unfavourable to IPOs are prime time for 
SPACs and vice versa.
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4. Hypotheses
In this section I present the hypotheses of the study. The hypotheses are categorized by the 
source or reasoning they are based on.
4.1. Hypotheses based on earlier literature
Based on the efficient markets theorem (see, e.g. fama, 1970), I hypothesize that investors are 
informed and able to value the proposed mergers correctly, thus resulting in higher abnormal 
returns in the agreement announcement for the deals that are eventually completed compared 
to the whole sample.
HI: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event for the sample of 
completed mergers are higher than for the whole sample.
According Jensen’ sfree cash flow hypothesis, debt financing can be considered an instrument 
of mitigation for the conflict between management and shareholders. This view is based on a 
two-fold reasoning: First, the higher the level of debt in a company is, the less the 
management has free cash flows to spend in perks or empire building. Second, the higher the 
profitability of a company is, the more free cash flows the management has as its disposal. 
Therefore shareholders can use debt financing to “hold management on a leash” and reduce 
the free cash flows available to them. Thus, in H2 I hypothesise that transactions with higher 
leverage increase corporate governance and are more favourably received by investors.
H2: Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are positively 
correlated with the level of debt used in the transaction.
At times of high cost of debt, high quality companies in need of financing are more likely to 
go public through an IPO to have better access to equity financing (Bayar and Chemmanur, 
2006). High cost of debt also prohibits the extensive use of debt in the acquisition, which 
causes less net gain from the benefits of using debt to mitigate agency problems in the target 
company. Based on this I hypothesize that
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НЗа: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 
correlated with the cost of debt.
H3b: Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are negatively 
correlated with the cost of debt.
Earlier literature is contradicting when it comes to payment method and acquisitions of 
private targets. Officer et al. (2007) conclude in their unpublished working paper that positive 
abnormal returns to public acquirers of private targets are driven by the use of stock-swap as 
a method of payment in acquisitions of relatively opaque and speculative targets. This 
phenomenon was first documented by Chang (1998). Based on the research on acquisitions 
of private targets I hypothesize in H4 that
H4: Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are higher for deals 
that use stock as payment.
Studies by Amihud and Mendelson (1989), Amihud (2002) and Lemer and Schoar (2004) all 
show evidence that illiquid securities carry an illiquidity discount and are therefore subject to 
higher abnormal returns during positive events. I therefore hypothesize that less liquid 
SPACs experience higher abnormal returns during the event windows studied in this thesis.
H5a: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 
correlated with daily trading volume.
H5b: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 
correlated with daily trading volume.
Gompers and Lemer (2006) study how capital available to private equity funds affects the 
valuations of new investments. They find evidence for a positive correlation between the 
level of new funds inflow to venture capital funds and valuation levels of subsequent target 
companies. Based on this evidence I hypothesize that managers of larger SPACs also value 
their acquisition targets relatively higher than managers of smaller SPACs and therefore are 
more likely to overvalue their proposed mergers, thus resulting in winner’s curse and worse 
share price performance.
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Нба: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 
correlated with the SPAC IPO gross proceeds.
H6b: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 
correlated with the SPAC IPO gross proceeds.
4.2. SPAC specific hypotheses
As the liquidation date of a SPAC is fixed, the acquisition window available to the 
management team can be regarded as time value for finding suitable acquisition targets. It 
can be argued that an early acquisition announcement implies that, in management’s opinion, 
the value of the proposed acquisition at hand exceeds the expected value they assign to the 
time left to find an acquisition target. Weaker returns for announcements of soon-to-be- 
liquidating SPACs could suggest the existence of an agency problem originating from the 
financial position of the management or from the interests of the underwriter trying to 
achieve her contingent fees.
H7a: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are positively 
correlated with the time left in the acquisition window.
H7b: Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are positively 
correlated with the time left in the acquisition window.
Typically in stock market based event studies the abnormal returns are found to accumulate 
in the pre-event period immediately before the event day. This may be interpreted as a 
consequence of insider trading or leakage of insider information. On the other hand, the pre­
event abnormal returns may also be a reaction to public information that increases the 
probability of a transaction. In the case of a SPAC’s announcement of merger completion, the 
information available to investors prior to the event is extensive and allows for a careful 
valuation of the deal. I propose that if a shareholder finds the merger favourable, she will 
expect other shareholders to hold the same view, thus reflecting on the share price before the 
announcement. On the other hand, information should not be available before the merger 
agreement announcement. SPACs are typically listed on exchanges with looser regulations 
especially regarding insider trading and disclosure, which I hypothesize that also leads to 
information leaks even before the merger agreement announcement event.
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H8a: Pre-announcement abnormal returns start to accumulate prior to the merger agreement 
announcement.
H8b: Pre-announcement abnormal returns start to accumulate prior to the merger 
completion announcement.
Regardless of typically moving to larger exchanges with more liquidity when the merger is 
completed, the lack of analyst coverage on the new public company is not expected to attract 
immediate investor interest, as information regarding the company is scantly available. Thus,
I hypothesise that the completion of a reverse merger has no imminent positive effect on the 
trading volumes ofSPACs. I will test the changes in trading volumes in a separate t-test.
H9: Trading volumes do not increase immediately after a merger is completed.
I employ Rau’s (2000) disposition that using contingent fees may drive banks to behave 
opportunistically. Based on this assumption I hypothesize that the deferred underwriter’s fee 
is actually not good news for the SPAC shareholders, but in addition to being a contingent 
liability, contributes to lesser quality of acquisition targets, thus negatively correlating with 
the SPAC share price performance:
H10: Abnormal returns in the merger completion event are negatively correlated with the 
size of the deferred underwriter ’s fee.
As the final hypothesis of the study I propose that the management teams more confident in 
their ability to complete a merger accept higher percentages of IPO proceed to be placed in 
the trust fund. As shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the management of the company 
has superior information regarding the future investment opportunities. This could also hold 
for investment vehicles such as SPACs leading the management to signal their self-perceived 
competence with methods available. Thus, in Hl l I hypothesize that the level of IPO 
proceeds in the trust fund works as a proxy to SPAC quality
Hila: Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are positively 
correlated with the percentage of IPO proceeds placed in trust fund.
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HI lb: Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are positively 
correlated with the percentage of IPO proceeds placed in trust fund.
Finally, Table 1 presents a summary of the hypotheses.
Table 1. Summary of hypotheses
The table presents the hypotheses of this thesis along with their identifying abbreviation, the methodologies used to study the hypotheses, 
the variables observed and the expected signs of the variables. In the method column ES denotes event study, REG, denotes ordinary least
squares regres
Hypothesis




Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event for the sample of 
completed mergers are higher than for the whole sample
ES
H2
Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are positively correlated 




Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 
correlated with the cost of debt
Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are negatively 
correlated with the cost of debt
REG RISKFREE -
HA




Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 




Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 
correlated with the SPAC IPO gross proceeds
Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively 




Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are positively correlated 
with the time left in the acquisition window.
Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are positively correlated 





Pre-announcement abnormal returns start to accumulate prior to the merger agreement
announcement.
Pre-announcement abnormal returns start to accumulate prior to the merger completion 
announcement.
ES
H9 Trading volumes do not increase immediately after a merger is completed. SA
H10
Abnormal returns in the merger completion event are negatively correlated with the size 




Abnormal returns in the merger announcement event are positively correlated with the 
amount of IPO proceeds placed in trust fund.
Abnormal returns in the merger completion event are positively correlated with the 






5. Data and Methodology
This section describes the data used in the study and presents the methodologies employed in 
the empirical part of the thesis. First, I describe the data sample, its characteristics and 
methods employed in obtaining the data. Next section discusses the methodology for 
calculating abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. Finally, I define the 
regression model that is built to study the determinants cumulative abnormal returns.
5.1. Data description
The sample gathered for this study consists of 152 SPACs that have gone public in the US 
during the period starting January 1st, 2003 and ending February 28th, 2008 and are included 
in the Morgan Joseph Acquisition Company Index (MJACI) quoted by Bloomberg.
The share price and daily trading volume data is obtained from and Thomson Datastream 
database complemented by share price data available on the Pink Sheets website. All other 
information is gathered from the SEC Edgar database by manually reading SPAC filings, 
namely IPO prospectuses (Form 424b) and current reports filings (Form 8-K).
Table 2 summarizes the stages of the sample SPACs. The sample includes 152 companies of 
which ten have been liquidated after reaching the acquisition window deadline without 
shareholder approval for a proposed merger (each liquidated SPAC has proposed one merger 
to its shareholders), 48 have merged with a target, 72 are seeking acquisition and have yet to 
propose one, and 24 are in the process of waiting for shareholder approval to complete a 
proposed merger. 11 SPACs in the sample have been liquidated.
The SPACs included in the sample are listed on Pink Sheets OTC market or American Stock 
Exchange.
The market return benchmark used in this study is the Russell 2000 index, which is 
commonly used as the reference index for SPACs (see e.g. SPAC Analytics, Deal flow 
Media). The risk-free rate used in this study is the 3-month T-bills rate.
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Table 2 presents the sample size distribution across the possible events during a SPAC’s life 
cycle on February 28th, 2008 and the sample sizes for the studied events.
Table 2. Sample breakdown by phase
The table presents the sample size breakdown by current stage and event. The full sample size is 152 SPACs, but only 
82 have announced a merger. Of those 82 48 have completed a merger, 11 have been liquidated and 23 are still in the 
merger process. However, the actual sample size is limited by the availability of data. Rightmost column provides the
active sample size used in this thesis.




Seeking acquisition target 70 70
Merger in process 23 22
Merger approved and completed 48 38
Liquidated 11 10
Event sample sizes
Merger agreement announced 82 72
Merger approved and completed 48 38
Liquidation 11 10
The following section provides descriptive statistics on the sample of 152 US SPACs used in 
this study along with preliminary analysis. As SPACs are self-regulatory to a great extent, 
and free to adjust their restrictions to better suit the market demand, the following statistics 
are produced to document trends in SPAC characteristics.
Table 3 presents overview of characteristics of SPACs listed in Pink Sheets OTC market or 
American Stock Exchange during January 1st, 2003 - February 28th, 2008. From each section 
of the data we can see several trends emerging: (i) increasing mean sizes of SPACs, (ii) 
placing of 100% of IPO proceeds in trust fund, (iii) underwriter fees converging to 7%, (iv) 
increasing percentage of underwriter’s fee payable after merger, and (v) increasing level of 
shareholder votes required to disapprove a proposed merger.
Increasing mean size and adjustments in handling of underwriter fees and IPO gross proceeds 
suggests that SPACs are maturing as an asset class. Investors’ financial position has greatly 
improved judging from the mean values in 2004 to those of 2007. On average, per every 
$100,000 invested in 2007 an investor’s guaranteed walk-away position has improved from a 
loss of up to $20,781 to a loss of up to $5,740, i.e. a from a return of -20.78% to -5.74%.
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New asset classes with expanding markets also attract attempts to exploit any loopholes. In 
SPACs, one such loophole has been the shareholder approval vote, which has, consistent with 
Rule 419, traditionally required only 20% of votes to disapprove a merger. Several cases 
documented in 2006-20078 report an activist fund carrying out what later has been named 
”spacmail”. In a spacmail attempt an activist fund acquires a block of SPAC shares required 
to disapprove the merger and threatens to vote against the merger unless management 
purchases the fund’s shares at a premium. Later SPACs have fought this activism by 
increasing the typical level of the required vote to 30% and in some cases even beyond. 
Along with increasing sizes, the increased level of the votes required to disapprove has made 
it more difficult for spacmail to take place.
Table 3 presents statistics of the sample of SPACs used in this study. As an emerging 
phenomenon it is expected that the highest number of observations for full years is in the 
latest full year of the sample.
Table 3. Sample SPAC characteristics by year issued
SPAC IPO gross proceeds ($ OOO)
2003 2 51.246 24,150
2004 11 455,868 7,878
2005 28 2.098,551 15,250
2006 35 3.175,113 18,975
2007 65 11,033,670 28,750
2008* 11 3.3S3.363 41,400
Whole sample 152 20,197,811 M7.
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Panel A: SPAC characteristics






















Percentage of IPO proceeds (net of fees} placed in trust fund
2003 2 85.00% 85.00%
2004 11 85.00% 100.00%
2005 28 86.00% 100.00%
2006 35 90.80% 103.00%
2007 65 95.00% 100.00%
2008* 11 98.50% 100.40 %
Whole sample 152 85.00% 103.00%
Percentage of underwriter's fee paid on completion of a merger
"2ÔÔ3 2 0.00 % 0.00%
2004 II 0.00% 0.00%
2005 28 0.00 % 57.14%
2006 35 0.00% 75.00%
2007 65 0.00% 71.00%
2008• _________ 11________ 38.00%________ 7400%



























































* Deal flow Media, SPAC Report 1/2007
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Panel B: Original shareholders ownership and investment
Year Issued N Min Max Mean Median Year Issued N Min Max
Mean Median
Original shareholders ownership post-IPO
Whole sample 152
Management warrant purchase committment
2003 2
2004 11
2005 28 11,325 1,070
2006 35 8,254 1,697 1,020
2007 65 1,500 7,500 3,590 3,000
2008• 11 5,800 5,800 5,800 5,800
Whole sample 152 11,325 1,621 700
Management original investment
2003 2 17.60% 20.00% 18.80 % 18.80% 2003
2004 11 0.01% 21.70% 18.34 % 20.00% 2004
2005 28 0.00% 35.00% 18.97 % 20.00% 2005
2006 35 0.00% 26.67% 18.94% 20.00% 2006
2007 65 17.90% 22.01 % 20.15 % 20.00% 2007













Whole sample 152 8,435







2003 2 17.50% 19.91 % 18.70% 18.70 %
2004 11 0.00% 21.60% 18.26% 19.91 %
2005 28 0.00% 34.99% 15.82% 19.95 %
2006 35 0.00% 26.54% 13.37% 19.95 %
2007 65 0.00% 21.99% 7.71% 0.00%
2008e 11
Whole sample 152 0.00% 34.99% 11.58% 19.91%
Panel C: Trading and merger statistics
Year Issued N Min Max Mean Median Year Issued N Min Max Mean
Median
Average daily trading volume Leverage used in transaction
2 38.487 39.707 39.097 39.097 2003 2 306.01 % 307.87 % 306.94% 306.94%
11 4.224 284.357 63.554 28.493 2004 9 0.00% 316.67 % 97.14% 58.82 %
28 1.022 1,963.488 89.737 28.440 2005 28 0.00% 544.59 % 69.84% 0.00%
35 1.022 1,963.488 104.188 21.216 2006 27 0.00% 544.59% 87.56 % 42.32 %
2007 65 11.119 561.109 67.591 40.190 2007 14 8.21% 290.13 % 149.17 % 149.17%
2008e 11 18.590 1,954.555 402.283 116.635 2008e 0 N/A N/A N/A
N/A
Whole sample 152 1.022 1,963.488 96.788 37.003 Whole sample 80 0.00% 544.59 % 87.96% 8.21%
Days between IPO and merger completion
2003 2 365 1,349 857.00 857.00
2004 11 250 753 603.00 715.00
2005 28 302 882 621.80 656.00
2006 27 302 723 524.00 546.00
2007 14 226 282 245.00 227.00
2008e 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Whole sample 82 226 1,349 604.88 653.00
Days between merger agreement and completion or liquidation
2003 2 171 455 313.00 313.00
2004 11 167 331 236.89 233.00
2005 28 83 575 24857 226.00
2006 27 83 394 229.00 226.00
2007 14 94 199 147.00 148.00
2008e 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Whole sample 82 83 575 242.84 221.00
♦Denotes an incomplete sample year
5.2. Event study methodology
The event study method is used to calculate abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns. The event study methodology is applied on two expected events per sample 
company:
1. The announcement of an merger agreement with a target company
2. The announcement of completion of the merger





Where R„ is the return of a security i at time t, C, is the closing price of the share i at time t, 
and C,_i is the closing price of the share i at time M.
5.2.2. Estimating the normal share price performance
The following sections discuss the methodologies selected to measure the normal share price 
performance in the merger announcement and merger completion events.
As SPACs have no cash-flow generating operations, their pre-announcement share value can 
be argued to consist of a combination of the amount of funds in trust per share, which 
provides the lower limit for the value and the expected value added by the potential 
upcoming merger. The expected value of a future merger can be considered consisting of 
three variables: (i) general market conditions, (ii) management competence, and (iii) time 
value (i.e. time until liquidation). Market conditions are an unpredictable factor and can be 
considered part of the disturbance term of the model. Management competence, on the other 
hand, is constant assuming an unchanged management team. Time until liquidation is a 
predictable factor that sets lower limit of zero for the value added by the potential merger as 
SPAC approaches its liquidation deadline.
Based on the facts presented above, I choose to use the constant mean return model as a 
method of measuring the performance of the share price at the merger agreement 
announcement event. The constant mean return model is
Ru ~ Mi+eи {г)
Where R„ is the daily return of security i at time t, //, is the mean return for security i, and 
en is the disturbance term for security i with an expectation of zero and variance crj .
The abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are derived using a 
standard (single index) market model as suggested by e.g. Fama (1973). The reasoning 
behind alternate method compared to the announcement event is twofold; first, the SPAC is
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now linked to an operating business entity that is subject to fluctuations in market conditions 
and can be valued with traditional valuation tools. Second, there now exists a second likely 
outcome in addition to the liquidation, which is also more probable to take place. Under these 
conditions, it is less justified to use the constant mean model but more so to employ the 
single index market model.
The market model assumes a linear relation between the return of a security and the market 
portfolio. According to the model, the return of a stock can be written as
(3)
where at is the expected value of the component of security z’s return that is independent of 
the market’s performance - a random variable, Rm, is the rate of return on the market index, 
also a random variable, Д is a constant of the expected change in Ru given a change in Rmt, 
and sit is the unexpected component due to unexpected events that are firm specific (e.g.
MacKinlay, 1997). By using Equation (4), the basic version of the market model is then 
estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. OLS method assumes that asset 
returns are jointly multivariate normal and independently and identically distributed through 
time. For the z:th firm in the event period, the OLS estimators of the market model 
parameters for an estimation window of observations are:
(4)
A = A -AAm (5)
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For both the constant mean return model and the market model estimators for the mean return 
of security z is defined as
(6)
and the mean market return is
(7)
The definitions of Tt (z = 0...3) and L, (z = 1...3) are depicted in Figure 1 where the 
estimation, event and post-event windows are illustrated.
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t = o is defined as the event date, t = 7¡ + 1 to t= T2 represents the event window, t = T0 + 1 
to t = 7¡ constitutes the estimation window, and t = T2 + 1 to t = 73 depicts the post-event 
window. Let Ц = -70, Ь2=Тг-Тх , and L, =T3-T2 be the length of the estimation 
window, the event window, and the post-event window, respectively.




And with the market model as
e,=AR„=R,-(â,+p,R.,) , (?)
where Rlt is the observed continuously compounded return for security i on day t.
Assessment of the relationship between transactions and stock market returns is carried out 
with standard methodology for event studies as firs presented by Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Fama et al. (1969). For reference, Elton and Gruber (1995) provide a clear presentation of the 
aspects of the event study method and MacKinlay (1997) discusses the various statistical 
problems in event studies.
First, the event period is determined and normal returns are defined. The event period (Z2) 
used is 20 days prior to and 20 days after the event. Abnormal returns are calculated for each 
day during the event period. Cumulative abnormal returns are also calculated for the period 
with various intervals. Normal return is defined as a security’s expected return under normal 
conditions, i.e. when no event takes place. As mentioned earlier, in this study the daily 
abnormal returns are generated employing a constant mean return model for the 
announcement event and the standard (single index) market model for the merger completion 
event. An estimation window (Z, ) used in this study includes 50 trading days - from day -70 
to day -21 - before the event and models for both events are then estimated using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method to calculate the parameters necessary for both models ( Ra , Rm, , 
a, , and Д ). The short length of the applied estimation window (Z, ) is due to two issues.
First, the share price data is rather limited and extending the evaluation period to standard 
200 days was ruled out for lack of data. Second, the shorter period is not expected to provide 
problems as SPACs trade very little and the movements in the share price are near negligible 
prior to the merger announcement.
The next step is to estimate abnormal returns (AR) on day t for a given security. The residual 
term (г,) from the market model is used to measure risk-adjusted abnormal return (see 
Equation 8). The average abnormal daily returns on a portfolio of stocks at any time t relative 
to event day equals:
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(10)
where N is the number of observations in the sample and eit is the abnormal daily return on 
security i on day /. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at time / relative to time /0 is 
computed as:
CAR(t„T)=)jY,AR, (11)
A /-test is used to assess the statistical difference of abnormal returns, Assuming security’s 
daily abnormal returns are independently and identically distributed, portfolio daily abnormal 
returns approach normal distribution for large samples under Central Limit Theorem (e.g. 
Elton and Gruber, 1995).
/AR ~
AR, /(7V-1) (12)
which is distributed Student-/ with 49 degrees of freedom (estimation period is N = 50 days) 
for the assumed normal and independent e„ and where &{aR,) is the sample standard 
deviation of the portfolio returns during the estimation period over the 50 days, -70 to -21, 
calculated as:
(13)
where AR, is the average portfolio abnormal return during the estimation period. In order to 
test whether the cumulative abnormal return from day / until / + n is significantly different 
from 0, a /-statistic is computed:
CAR;+n 
Vñ x â[AR, )
(14)
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where n is the number of days in the event window and is the sample standard
deviation of the portfolio abnormal returns as above.
5.3. Multivariate regression model methodology
To better understand which characteristics of a SPAC drive the performance of the share 
price during the merger announcement and merger completion I build a regression model. 
The aim of the model is to find any characteristics of SPACs that contribute to the 
performance of the share price and can be quantified and evaluated before a merger 
announcement is given.
The dependence between SPAC CARs and the independent variables in the common multiple 
OLS model is defined as:
CAR¡ -a + Д x, + ...ßkxk + e, , (15)
where the dependent variable is CAR,, the average cumulative abnormal return for company i, 
a is a constant, xv..xk are the examined independent variables and ßv-ßk are regression 
coefficients. eu is a residual term with an expected mean of zero. To test the hypothesis 
concerning a variable’s coefficient, its statistical significance is studied by using a standard 
two-tailed t-test.
Thus, I build a regression model that is developed to estimate the influence of the selected 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable (abnormal returns). I hypothesize that 13 
factors could explain the occurrence of abnormal returns. These are detailed in the next 
section
5.3.1. Independent variables
Reasoning for each variable included in the regression analysis is presented in this section 
along with the expected sign.
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SPAC IPO gross proceeds (LN SIZE; - )
The amount of funds raised by a SPAC in an IPO obviously allows for a greater base of 
potential acquisition targets. Although SPACs comply to Rule 419 with regards to the 
minimum fair market value of the net assets to be acquired being at least 80 % of the 
proceeds from the IPO, it is follows that potential for overvaluation exists, but undervaluation 
is unlikely as target shareholders will not approve undervalued offers. Gompers and Lemer 
(2000) study the effect of additional funds available for investments in the private equity 
realm and find evidence of positive correlation between funds available for investment and 
valuations of target companies.
Time until liquidation date (LN TIME; + )
Time until liquidation is included in the independent variables primarily based on the agency 
theory. Management’s compensation structure typically found in SPACs is a hotbed for 
agency-motivated acquisition attempts. Management along with any financial sponsors of the 
SPAC typically hold 20 % of shares post-IPO, but aren’t entitled to any compensation if 
merger does not take place and the SPAC is liquidated. I argue that this motivates the 
management to eventually push for approval of virtually any acquisition, as it is better than 
admitting defeat and losing any possibility of the huge returns as documented by Jog and Sun 
(2007).
Second argument for including the relative time of merger agreement announcement as a 
variable is that the time left until the date of liquidation of the SPAC represents also time 
value for the expected quality of the proposed merger. A rational management team passes on 
potential targets if they believe that a higher quality target is likely to be found during the 
time left until the liquidation date.
To measure the relative time until liquidation I use the proportion of the acquisition window 
that is left at the time of the announcement.
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Risk-free interest rate (RISKFREE; - )
The level of interest rates is a direct proxy for the cost of debt, which plays a crucial role in 
SPAC ability to create value. Higher cost of debt restricts use of debt in the merger, which in 
turn restricts the ability to benefit from reducing agency costs as proposed by e.g. Jensen 
(1986).
Leverage used in the transaction (LEVERAGE; + )
Leverage is measured as the relative cost of the acquired assets to the IPO proceeds. 
Leverage variable assumes for simplicity that no shares are converted in the merger approval 
process and that the whole amount raised in the IPO is available for investment.
Leverage is expected to have a positive sign in accordance to free cash flow theory.
Percentage of IPO proceeds placed in trust fund (INTRUST; + )
Although market conventions have highly affected the development of the amount of IPO 
gross proceeds that are placed in a trust fund, I argue that the percentage of funds placed in 
trust at offer signals management’s confidence in themselves to find a target that will gain 
sufficient shareholder approval. The percentage of IPO proceeds in trust fund can then be 
considered as a proxy for the quality of the SPAC.
Expected dilution from the original shareholders shares (DILUTION; -)
The management team typically retains 20 % of the shares in the SPAC. The amount of 
capital invested in the SPAC by the management is usually only $25,000. Until a merger is 
completed, the management is not entitled to any compensation based on their ownership or 
otherwise. At the moment of the merger completion the ownership of SPAC shareholders is 
diluted by the amount of the management’s ownership. The expected dilution is calculated as
SIZE - {SHARES%M x SIZE)+ INV 
DILUTION = 1----------- -------------- —--------- -------- — , (16)
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where SIZE is the gross proceeds from the SPAC IPO, SHARES%Mgl is the percentage of 
shares owned by the management team and the financial sponsors, and INVMgl is the amount 
of capital invested in the SPAC by the management team.
Underwriter ’s fee (UWFEE; + )
Underwriter’s fee is the total percentage agreed to be paid to the underwriter’s of the IPO. It 
includes the standard fee paid from IPO gross proceeds and the part that is paid only upon 
completion of a merger. Higher quality underwriter’s are typically associated with higher 
fees, thus the expected sign is positive.
Deferred underwriter ’s fee (UWFEEDEF; + )
The part of the IPO underwriter’s fee that is contingent on the SPAC’s consummation of a 
target business may signal the underwriter’s confidence in the management team to complete 
a merger. Bodnaruk et al. (2007) find in their unpublished working paper that investment 
banks involved in deals have superior information regarding the deal. If an underwriter 
agrees to defer a large amount of her fee it, can be interpreted as a signal of her confidence in 
the fact that the conditions for releasing the deferred portion of the fee will be met, i.e. a 
merger will be completed.
Average daily trading volume (TRADEVOL; -)
Trading volume is included in the list of variables as a proxy to liquidity. The illiquidity 
discount hypothesis states that illiquid securities are expected to experience higher abnormal 
returns at the time of positive news.
Industry focus (FOCUS; + )
Industry focus is included as a dummy variable. Industry focus is given a value of 1 if a 
SPAC’s prospectus defines a specific industry or industries the management focuses on and 
have a person in the management team or as an advisor who has experience in that sector. 
Otherwise its value is 0. I expect the sign for FOCUS to be positive due to management’s
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expected superior knowledge on the chosen field of focus.
Method of payment (PAYMETHOD; -)
Method of payment is included as a dummy variable. The variable is given a value of 1 if a 
part or the whole merger is financed by issuing new equity to the shareholders of the target 
company. Otherwise its value is 0. Cash deals are shown to perform better mostly due to use 
of debt. Thus, I expect PAYMETHOD to carry a negative sign.
Approved merger (APPROVED; + )
Approved merger flag is included as a dummy variable. The variable is given a value of 1 if 
the SPAC eventually completed a merger. Otherwise its value is 0. I expect markets to 
efficiently value the announcements and value eventually completed deals higher than the 
whole sample.
SPAC liquidated (LIQUIDATED; -)
The liquidated SPAC flag is included as a dummy variable. The variable is given a value of 1 
if the SPAC was not able to complete a merger and was liquidated. Otherwise its value is 0.1 
expect markets to efficiently value the announcements and value eventually disapproved 
deals lower than the whole sample.
Finally, Table 4 presents a summary of the variables and expected signs. The Pearson 
correlations are reported in Table 5.
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SIZE SPAC IPO gross proceeds (net of fees). -
LN TIME




Annual average of three-month Treasury notes rate at the merger 
announcement year.
-
LEVERAGE Leverage employed in the transaction +
INTRUST Percentage of shares placed in trust fund at IPO +
DILUTION
Expected percentage of dilution at merger completion due to 
original shareholders shares
-
UWFEE Total underwriter's fee (%) in IPO including any contingent portions. +
UWFEEDEF Underwriter’s fee payable only at the completion of a merger. -
TRADEVOL Average trading volume ($) -
FOCUS
Dummy variable with value 1 if SPAC focuses on specified industry 
or industries and otherwise 0.
+
PAYMETHOD
Dummy variable with value 1 is SPAC uses stock to finance part 
or whole of the merger and otherwise 0.
+
APPROVED
Dummy variable with value 1 if SPAC completed a merger and 
otherwise 0.
+
LIQUIDATED Dummy variable with value 1 if SPAC is liquidated. -
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Table 5. Variable correlations
The table reports the Pearson’s correlations for the variables in the regression analysis. Also reported is the number of observations and the 
statistical significances (p-value) of the correlations. The variables are defined as follows: TIME is the relative amount of time left in the 
acquisition window at the time of merger agreement announcement. SIZE is the amount of IPO gross proceeds. LEVERAGE is the relative 
size of the acquired assets to SIZE. INTRUST is the percentage of IPO gross proceeds placed in a trust fund. DILUTION is the dilution 
coming to effect at merger completion due to management owned shares. RISKFREE is the 3-month T-bills rate. INDUSTRY is a dummy 
variable with the value 1 if SPAC focuses on certain industry or industries and is 0 otherwise. UWFEE is the total underwriter’s fee (%) in 
the SPAC IPO. UWFEEDEF is the underwriter’s fee (%) that is paid only upon the completion of a merger. PAYMETHOD is a dummy 
variable with the value 1 if stock is used as a payment method in the merger and is 0 otherwise. APPROVED is a dummy variable with the 
value 1 if the SPAC has completed a merger and is 0 otherwise. LIQUIDATED is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the SPAC was 
liquidated and otherwise 0. For each coefficient, ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at 1 %, 5 % and 10 %




(2) INTRUST -0.06 1
Sig. 0.687
N 48 152
(3) DILUTION 0.177 -.480** 1
Sig. 0.223 0
N 49 152 153
(4) RISKFREE 0.327 -0.086 0.025 1
Sig. 0.103 0.444 0.825
N 26 81 81 82
(S) FOCUS -0.21 0.107 0.128 0.05 1
Sig. 0.156 0.315 0.231 0.729
N 47 90 90 51 90
(6) UWFEE 0.161 -.505** .200* 0.027 -.235* 1
Sig. 0.273 0 0.014 0.809 0.026
N 48 151 151 81 90 152
(7) UWFEEDEF 0.081 .637** -.301** -0.12 0.151 -.179* 1
Sig. 0.58 0 0 0.284 0.156 0.028
N 49 152 153 82 90 152 154
(8) PAYMETHOD -.340* -.377** .239** -0.183 0.103 .186* -.170* 1
Sig. 0.017 0 0.003 0.099 0.336 0.021 0.035
N 49 152 153 82 90 152 154 154
(9) APPROVED Dummy 0.217 -.570** .438“ 0.085 -0.055 .165* -.416" .346** 1
Sig. 0.135 0 0 0.45 0.607 0.042 0 0
N 49 152 153 82 90 152 154 154 154
(10) LIQUIDATED Dummy -0.217 -.237** 0.123 0.003 0.174 0.1 -.188* 0.119 -.167* 1
Sig. 0.135 0.003 0.13 0.98 0.102 0.219 0.019 0.142 0.038
N 49 152 153 82 90 152 154 154 154 154
(11) TRADEVOL .357* 0.178 -0.013 0.073 -0.051 -0.117 .397** -0.066 0.123 -0.033 1
Sig. 0.013 0.109 0.906 0.646 0.658 0.294 0 0.557 0.272 0.766
N 48 82 82 42 78 82 82 82 82 82 82
(12) LN SIZE 0.138 .437** -0.14 -0.091 0.138 -.405** .455” -.189* -.226** -0.082 .471** 1
Sig. 0.351 0 0.087 0.42 0.194 0 0 0.02 0.005 0.316 0
N 48 152 152 81 90 151 152 152 152 152 82 152
(13) ANNOTIMELEFT% 0.045 .232* -0.019 -0.008 -0.183 -.234* .257* -0.047 0.188 -.280* .309** .319“ 1
Sig. 0.763 0.037 0.865 0.961 0.112 0.035 0.021 0.68 0.093 0.011 0.005 0.004
N 48 81 81 42 77 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81
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6. Empirical results and analysis
This section presents the empirical results of the study. First, the descriptive sample 
characteristics are presented. Secondly, the market reactions to merger agreement and merger 
completion announcements are discussed. The third and final part provides results from the 
regression analysis for finding significant determinants of the market reaction to the 
announcement events.
6.1. Abnormal returns during merger announcement
The sample for the merger agreement announcement event study includes 74 observations 
during the research period from January 1, 2003 to February 28th, 2008. Table 4 depicts the 
cumulative abnormal results for various intervals.
In Panel A of Table 4 we find the results for the whole sample of the merger agreement 
announcement event. Limited sample size reduces the statistical significance of the results, 
but several issues arise from the data. Pre-announcement average CARs are all statistically 
significant at 10 % level and positive, although the mean values range only between 0.87 and 
1.77 percent. Minimum values of the three pre-announcement CARs are all negative, largest 
negative being -19.30 % found in the (-20, -1) period. Such abnormal returns are surprising 
as investors have the option to convert their shares to cash at the time of the shareholder vote. 
This implies trading which may stem from an individual investor being forced to liquidate 
her position too swiftly for the generally low liquidity of SPAC shares to allow the price to 
stay at a fair level. Another explanation is that investors who don’t like the proposed deal sell 
their shares when the share price is at a premium over the conversion value.
Announcement window average CARs carry less statistical significance, although the 2.19 % 
in the (-5, +5) window is significant at 5 % level. It is interesting to note that, while not 
statistically significant, most of the abnormal returns in the (-20, +20) window are 
accumulated in the pre-announcement period. This suggests that even in the merger 
announcement event some information is leaked and positive abnormal returns start to 
accumulate prior to the announcement. This result suggests accepting H3a. Interestingly
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enough, the periods that are typically at the crux (i.e., (-1, +1) and event day 0) of an event 
study show little or no positive returns and are not statistically significant.
Panel В of Table 4 shows the CARs for the SPACs that eventually completed a merger. In 
support of HI, we find that the returns in Panel В are throughout higher than those for the 
whole sample in Panel A. Although statistical significance is again an issue, we find results 
for the pre-announcement windows of (-20, -1) and (-10, -1) to be significant at 5 % level. 
Also announcement window results for (-10, +10) and (-5, +5) are significant at 10 % level.
Panels C and D in Table 4 show CARs for the sample of SPACs that were eventually 
liquidated and for the sample of SPACs in process without a known outcome respectively. 
Sample sizes for these breakdowns hinder the statistical significance of the results with the 
exception of the (-1, +20) window where a negative return of -2.219 % is statistically 
significant at 5 % level.
Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns in the merger announcement event
The table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns on different event windows for 38 SPACs that successfully completed a merger in 
1/2003-2/2008. Also, statistical significance (p-value) along with maximum, minimum and median values for each event window are 
reported.
Panel A Panel В
Whole sample (N = 72) Completed mergers (N = 38 )
Period Mean Sig. Max Min Median Period Mean Sig. Max Min Median
Pre-announcement Pre-announcement
(-20, -1) 1.77% 0.052 30.52 % -19.30 % 1.19% (-20, -1) 2.24% 0.021 20.67 % -8.49 % 2.31%
(1.972) (2.405)
(-10, -1) 0.92% 0.064 12.48% -10.27 % 0.29% (-10,-1) 1.29 % 0.043 12.48 % -5.86 % 0.36%
(1.884) (2.096)
(-5,-1) 0.87 % 0.082 22.28% -7.32 % -0.19% (-5.-1) 1.04 % 0.141 22.28% -4.74% -0.36%
(1.763) (1.506)
Announcement Announcement
(-20, +20) 2.41 % 0.200 86.46 % -34.03 % -0.13% (-20, +20) 5.02 % 0.101 86.46 % -21.54% 2.59 %
(1.294) (1.683)
(-10, +10) 1.79 % 0.121 51.6% -19.20 % -0.12 % (-10, +10) 3.031% 0.087 51.60% -19.20% 0.95%
(1.569) (1.758)
(-5, +5) 2.19% 0.030 45.84% -14.37 % 0.71% (-5,+5) 3.28% 0.059 45.84% -14.37 % 1.28 %
(2.208) (1.945)
M.+D 0.51% 0.220 23.13% -6.81 % 0.03 % (-1.+1) 0.79 % 0.269 23.13% -6.81 % 1.05 %
(1.237) (1.123)
(0) -0.05% 0.702 5.49 % -5.90 % 0.10% (0) 0.06% 0.707 5.49 % -1.63 % 0.24 %
(-0.384) (0.379)
Post-announcement Post-announcement
(-1.+5) 1.24% 0.199 48.28 % -19.33 % 0.23% (-1.+5) 2.17% 0.221 48.28% -19.33 % 0.58%
(1.295) (1.244)
(-1, +10) 0.79 % 0.470 43.93% -31.24 % -1.12 % (-1, +10) 1.94% 0.322 43.93 % -31.24% -0.63%
(0.726) (1.004)




Liquidated SPACs (N = 10 )
Period Mein Sig. Max Min Median
Pre-announcement
(-20,-1) 3.21 % 
(0.999)
0.158 30.52% -5.46% 2.46%
(-10,-1) ■0.41 % 
(-0.363)
0.553 5.81% -6.72% 0.70%
(-5,-1) -0.02%
(-0.024)




0.416 30.08% -8.54% -2.51 %
(-10, *10) 1.16%
(0.514)
0.813 15.79% -9.68% -1.37%
<-S,+S) 0.13%
(0.118)
0.744 6.52% -3.97% -1.68%
K*i) 0.54%
(0.774)
0.976 3.89% -2.90% -0.95%
(0) 0.22%
(0.626)




0.485 4.62% -8.01% -1.72%
(-1, +10) 1.67%
(1.162)
0.890 10.18% -7.14% -2.07%
(-1, +20) -0.44%
(-0.245)
0.382 10.01 % -6.15% -4.23%
Panel D
Merger announced, In process (N = 22)




0.886 24.15% -19.30% -1.31%
(-10,-1) 0.90%
(0.907)
0.332 9.52% -10.27% -0.14%
(-5,-1) 0.96%
(1.008)




0.225 24.80% -34.03% -3.38%
(-10,4-101 -0.19%
(-0.127)
0.897 14.32 % -11.49 % -1.32%
(-5,4-5) 1.40%
(1.065)
0.169 17.33% -10.98% 0.37%
1-1, *1) 0.10%
(0.190)
0.964 5.93% -6.71% -0.60%
(0) -0.32%
(-1.111)




0.334 11.96% -6.71% 0.22%
(-1,410) -1.24%
(-1.126)
0.255 10.76 % -9.57% -2.30%
("1, *20) -2.22 % 
(-1777)
0.024 10.76% -15.22 % -3.02 %
Table 7. Abnormal returns in merger announcement event window
The table reports mean daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative mean daily abnormal returns (CAR) for 72 SPACs that announced a 
merger in 1/2003-2/2008. The table also reports the t-statistics from two-tailed t-tests and statistical significances for each day of the period.






























































































































0.66% 2.44% 2.164 0.034
0.69% 3.12% 1.596 0.115
0.28% 3.40% 0.945 0.348
0.04% 3.44% 0.224 0.824
-0.23% 3.20% -1.699 0.094
0.14% 3.35% 0.553 0.582
-0.18 % 3.16% -1.067 0.290
-0.27% 2.90% -1.661 0.101
-0.03 % 2.87% -0.143 0.886
-0.16% 2.71% -0.79 0.432
0.12% 2.82% 0.518 0.606
-0.28% 2.54% -1.535 0.130
-0.44% 2.10% -1.182 0.242
0.23% 2.33% 1.525 0.132
-0.09% 2.24% -0.265 0.792
-0.04% 2.20% -0.223 0.824
-0.13% 2.07% -0.58 0.564
0.18% 2.26% 1.073 0.287
0.09% 2.35% 0.484 0.630
0.10% 2.45% 0.51 0.612
Figure 3 presents the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the whole sample in the 
event window (-20, +20). We see that highest daily abnormal return is rather modest at well 
below one percent. It appears that the announcement event is not considered to be significant 
news nor does it stimulate trading activity. This is supported by the data in Table 5, which 
presents the daily abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns in the merger announcement
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window (-20, +20). While most of the days are not statistically significant, we see that the 
daily ARs are very low even in the vicinity of the event date.
However, we find support for the notion that returns start to accumulate prior to the 
announcement event. This is evident from the profile of the cumulative abnormal returns, 
which greatly differs from those typically associated with a significant event: instead of the 
typical accumulation of the abnormal returns within one or two days around the event date 
we find the abnormal returns accumulating with a moderate slope starting already 14 days 
prior to the event date.
Figure 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns to each subset to examine their 
differences. Support for the superior performance of completed mergers is found, but given 
the poor statistical significance of the data, further analysis is futile.
In summary, the cumulative abnormal returns in the merger announcement event are small 
and start to accumulate well before the event date.
Figure 3. Merger announcement: Abnormal returns in the event window
The figure shows mean daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 72 SPACs that announced a merger 
agreement with a target company in 1/2003-2/2008 from 20 days before the announcement through 20 days after the announcement. The 
abnormal return is calculated based on constant mean model parameters estimated in (-70, -21) before the announcement event. The x-axis 
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The figure shows mean daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 72 SPACs that announced a merger 
agreement with a target company in 1/2003-2/2008 from 20 days before the announcement through 20 days after the announcement. The 
sample is divided into subsets based on the post-announcement status; 38 SPACs that have successfiilly completed a merger, 11 SPACs that 
were liquidated and 23 SPACs that have yet to vote on the merger. The abnormal return is calculated based on constant mean model 
parameters estimated in (-70, -21) before the announcement event. The x-axis is the day relative to the merger completion announcement
Figure 4. Merger announcement: Subsample abnormal returns in the event window
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6.2. Abnormal returns during merger completion
CARs for the merger completion announcement are depicted in Table 6. The small sample 
size again severely restricts our analysis yielding no statistically significant results. While 
returns in the (-1, +1) window and at event date are positive, the data suggests that the CARs 
diminish shortly after the event date.
The behaviour of the abnormal returns is depicted in Figure 4. The three days prior to the 
event date we experience negative returns for the sample, which creates a dip in the 
cumulative abnormal returns and hinders making any definitive conclusions regarding the 
timing and accumulation of abnormal returns in the pre-event window. Again, highest daily 
mean abnormal returns are very modest at approximately two percent, but unlike in the 
announcement event, we can identify positive ARs in the immediate vicinity ot the event date 
in (-1, +1) and (0). The daily average ARs for the whole sample are presented in Table 7. 
However, it should be noted that observing the maximum values implies that investors
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screening the merger proposals of their SPACs carefully are able to achieve very high 
abnormal returns.
Table 8. Cumulative abnormal returns at merger completion announcement
The table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns on different event windows for 38 SPACs that successfully completed a merger in 
1/2003-2/2008. Also statistical significance (p-value) along with maximum, minimum and median values for each event window are
reported.
Period Mean t-stat Sig. Max Min Median
Pre-announcement
(-20, -1) -1.97 % 
(-0.706)
-0.706 0.484 19.14% -16.31 % 1.90 %
(-10, -1) -1.23 % 
(-0.499)
-0.499 0.620 18.32 % -14.78 % 1.44%
(-5,-1) -2.03 % 
(-0.751)
-0.751 0.457 12.27 % -11.10 % 0.04 %
Announcement
(-20, +20) -4.13 % 
(-1.087)
-1.087 0.283 64.37 % -79.71 % -4.03 %
(-10, +10) -0.003
(-0.084)
-0.084 0.933 85.45 % -203.95 % -3.96 %
(-5, +5) 0.004
(0.171)
0.171 0.865 66.26 % -37.99 % -0.94 %
(-1, +1) 2.74%
(0.77)
0.77 0.446 162.96 % -27.83 % -1.10 %
(0) 2.04 % 
(0.808)
0.808 0.424 64.57 % -23.04 % 0.29 %
Post-announcement
(-1, +5) 1.37 % 
(0.349)
0.349 0.729 174.06 % -32.76 % -2.46 %
(-1, +10) -0.10 % 
(-0.024)
-0.024 0.981 176.62 % -212.56 % -4.85 %
(-1, +20) -3.23 % 
(-0.713)
-0.713 0.480 163.22 % -69.51 % -5.92 %
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Table 9. Merger completion: Abnormal returns in the event window
The table reports mean daily abnormal returns i 
merger in 1/2003-2/2008. The table also reports i
Day AR CAR t-stat
-20 -0.09% -0.09% -0.28
-19 0.35% 0.26% 1.068
-18 -0.47% -0.21% -1.505
-17 -0.18 % -0.39% -0.444
-16 0.31% -0.08% 0.624
-15 0.04% -0.04% 0.128
-14 -0.04% -0.09% -0.176
-13 0.05% -0.03% 0.197
-12 -0.59% -0.62 % -1.53
-11 -0.13 % -0.76% -0.608
-10 0.08% -0.67% 0.321
-9 0.21% -0.46 % 0.826
-8 0.35% -0.11% 0.834
-7 -0.07% -0.17% -0.23
-6 0.22% 0.05% 0.576
-5 0.64% 0.69% 1.479
-4 -0.08% 0.61% -0.344
-3 -0.85% -0.24% -0.605
-2 -0.67% -0.91% -0.945
-1 -1.07 % -1.99 % -1.508
0 2.04% 0.06% 0.808










































1.77% 1.83% 1.081 0.286
-0.32% 1.51% -1.02 0.314
0.00% 1.51% -0.003 0.998
-0.51% 1.00% -1.498 0.142
-0.55% 0.46% -1.472 0.149
0.09% 0.54% 0.192 0.849
-0.15% 0.40% -0.566 0.574
-0.94% -0.54 % -2.119 0.040
-0.09 % -0.64 % -0.326 0.746
-0.41% -1.05 % -0.84 0.406
0.69% -0.36% 0.984 0.331
-0.28% -0.64% -0.752 0.456
-0.45% -1.09 % -1.059 0.296
-0.34 % -1.43 % -0.936 0.355
-0.30 % -1.72 % -0.742 0.462
-1.17 % -2.89 % -3.323 0.002
0.11% -2.78 % 0.253 0.801
-0.36% -3.14 % -1.142 0.261
-0.49 % -3.63 % -1.733 0.091
-0.70 % -4.33 % -1.538 0.132
To further examine the returns and their development beyond the (-20, +20) event window I 
present the abnormal returns for (-1, +70) in Figure 5. The message is quite discouraging as 
the negative returns continue throughout the whole period steadily decreasing the cumulative 
abnormal returns. This is intuitively consistent with the level of dilution shareholders in a 
completed merger experience. However, the reasons are addressed in greater detail in the 
next section in the regression analysis.
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The figure shows mean daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 38 SPACs that successfully completed a 
merger with a target company in 1/2003-2/2008 from 20 days before the announcement through 20 days after the announcement. The 
abnormal return is calculated based on the market model parameters estimated in (-70, -21) before the event date using Russell 2000 as the 
market proxy. The x-axis is the day relative to the merger completion announcement date, t he у-axis is the cumulative abnormal return.......
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Figure 6. Merger completion: Abnormal returns in the post-event window (0, +70)
The figure shows mean daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 38 SPACs that successfully completed a 
merger with a target company in 1/2003-2/2008 from 1 day before the announcement through 70 days after the announcement. The 
abnormal return is calculated based on the market model parameters estimated in (-70, -21) before the event date using Russell 2000 as the 
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6.3. Multivariate regression analysis
In this section I report the results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
All regression setups are run for (-5, +5) and (-1, +20) windows. Regressions were also run 
for (-1, +1), but based on CAR analyses in section 7.2 and 7.3 individual observations 
dominate the results in the three-day period and the results do not accurately represent the 
sample, nor yield statistically significant results. The extended (-1, +20) window was chosen 
to present a more complete view of the share price development as event study analysis in 
previous section showed negative CARs in the period after merger completion.
6.3.1. Merger agreement announcement
I use regression analysis to examine the abnormal returns in the merger agreement 
announcement event for the whole sample of merger announcements and then run the 
analysis on the sample restricted to SPACs that eventually completed a merger.
The results from the regression analysis for the (-5, +5) and (-1, +20) windows are depicted 
in Panel A of Table 8. Models (1) and (4) include all variables used in the regression analysis. 
Models (2) and (5) are used to highlight the coefficients of SPAC or deal characteristics that 
are clearly discussed in earlier literature. Models (3) and (6), in turn, are used emphasize the 
investor perspective and include the characteristics of a SPAC known at the time of the IPO.
Panel A yields little results due to lack of statistical significance. However, some implications 
arise from the data. The level of trading volume does seem to be negatively correlated with 
the returns, thus supporting the liquidity discount hypothesis arising from earlier literature. 
The coefficient for the size of the deferred underwriter’s fee is also negative in all models it is 
included in. This suggests that investors at the very least perceive it as a contingent liability 
which at the time of the merger announcement has an increased probability of coming to 
effect. Leverage sees coefficients very close to zero. This could be due to the fact that at the 
time of the announcement very little deal specific information is released or even known by 
the management. Size of the SPAC seems also to play no role in determining the abnormal 
returns in either observation window.
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Table 10. Regression analysis results for merger announcement
The table presents ordinary least squares regression models for the determination of cumulative abnormal returns in selected event windows. 
Models (1) and (2) include all variables. Models (2) and (5) include variables directly relevant to earlier literature. Models (3) and (6) 
include variables related to SPAC characteristics known at the time of the IPO. The table reports the regression coefficients and t-statistics 
(in parentheses) for the independent variables in the model along with the F-value, statistical significance (p-value), R and adjusted R For 
each coefficient, ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels respectively. Dependent 
variables in the models are the cumulative abnormal returns during either a period of (-5, +5) or (-1, +20) around the merger announcement 
date, which is day 0. Independent variables are defined as follows: TIME is the relative amount of time left in the acquisition window at the 
time of merger agreement announcement. SIZE is the amount of IPO gross proceeds. LEVERAGE is the relative size of the acquired assets 
to SIZE. INTRUST is the percentage of IPO gross proceeds placed in a trust fund. DILUTION is the dilution coming to effect at merger 
completion due to management owned shares. RISKFREE is the 3-month T-bills rate. INDUSTRY is a dummy variable with the value 1 if 
SPAC focuses on certain industry or industries and is 0 otherwise. UWFEE is the total underwriter's fee (%) in the SPAC IPO. UWFEEDEF 
is the underwriter’s fee (%) that is paid only upon the completion of a merger. PAYMETHOD is a dummy variable with the value 1 if stock 
is used as a payment method in the merger and is 0 otherwise. APPROVED is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the SPAC has
completed^jner^e^mT^is^othe^ise^^LIQUro^^EDJs^dummy^ari^l^wdtlOhej^alue^j^he^SPACwasJi^uidated^and^otiterodse^O^^




CARS (-5, +5) CARS (-1.+20)
ui (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Constant) -0.598 -0.015 -0.367 0.485 -0.044 0.595
(-0.645) (-0.158) (-1.019) (0.333) (-0.311) (1.060)
LEVERAGE + 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.021
(0.226) (0.476) (0.409) (0.83)
INTRUST + 0.480 0.361 -0.512 -0.449
(0.560) (1-117) (-0.379) (-0.890)
DILUTION - 0.105 0.137 0.131 0.258
(0.233) (0.741) (0.186) (0.898)
RISKFREE - 0.957 0.764 0.667
(0.351) (0.395) (0.155)
FOCUS + -0.028 -0.030 -0.014 -0.018
(-0.478) (-1.356) (-0.15) (-0.539)
UWFEE + 0.732 0.613 -0.177 -0.154
(0.335) (0.690) (-0.051) (-0.111)
UWFEEDEF - -1.549 -1.514 -0.373 -0.619
(-0.696) (-1.733) (-0.106) (-0.454)
PAYMETHOD + 0.033 0.021 0.031 0.060
(0.413) (0.380) (0.244) (0.333)
TRADEVOL - -0.261 -0.253 -0.571 -0.652
(-0.444) (-0.704) (-0.617) (0.718)
LN SIZE - 0.005 0.002 -0.005 -0.017
(0.121) (0.093) (-0.081) (-0.677)






F-stat 0.173 0.211 1.172 0.159 0.524 1.225
Slg. 0.998 0.929 0.332 0.999 0.719 0.305
R2 0.158 0.039 0.099 0.091 0.091 0.103



















Panel B: Completed mergers (N = 38)
Expected
sign
CARS (-5, +5) CARS (-1, +20)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (ID (12)
-0.249 0.034 0.025 1.074 0.067 1.231
(-0.212) (-0.267) (-0.042) (0.551) (-0.324) -1.210
+ 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.020
(0.13S) (0.101) (0.153) (0.549)
+ 0.156 0.107 0.824 0.864
(0.119) -0.180 (-0.379) (-0.851)
-0.226 0.231 0.610 0.408
(-0.287) (-0.709) (0.468) (0.736)
2.285 1.397 2.731 1.800
(0.S83) (0.557) (0.421) (0.437)
+ -0.075 0.058 0.053 0.075
(-0.769) (-1.474) (-0.328) (-1.111)
+ -0.491 0.566 0.749 0.937
(-0.169) (-0.438) (0.155) (-0.427)
-0.547 -1.341 1.988 1.046
(-0.161) (-0.893) (0.353) -0.410
+ 0.051 0.017 0.015 0.055
(0.S17) (0.248) (-0.093) (0.481)
-0.407 0.201 0.560 0.713
(-0.495) (-0.503) (-0.411) (-1.085)
0.009 0.008 0.068 0.037



























Panel В presents the regression results for the sample of SPAC that eventually completed a 
merger. The results are similar to those for the whole sample as statistical significance is 
again very low and no statistically significant results are found. Consistent with the whole 
sample data, negative trading volume supports the liquidity discount hypothesis. Level of 
interest rates appears emphasized over the whole sample with clearly positive coefficients. 
This contradicts earlier literature as high cost of debt should encourage companies to go 
public through an IPO themselves. Higher cost of debt also hinders SPACs to use debt to 
finance the acquisition and gain benefits suggested by agency or free cash flow theory.
Adjusted R2 values for all models are very low, which is consistent with the low observed 
levels of the abnormal returns; noise trading and deal specific factors may well account for 
the majority of the returns. This would partly explain the lack ot statistically significant
results.
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6.3.2. Merger completion announcement
The results from the regression analysis for the (-5, +5) and (-1, +20) windows in the merger 
completion are depicted in Table 9. Models (13) and (17) include all variables used in the 
regression analysis. Models (14) and (18) are formulated by staring with the models (13) and 
(17) and removing a single variable at a time in order of least statistical significance. The 
resulting models are then evaluated and the one with the highest adjusted R2 is chosen. 
Models (15) and (19) are used to highlight the coefficients of SPAC or deal characteristics 
that are addressed in earlier literature. Models (16) and (20) are again used emphasize the 
investor perspective and include the characteristics of a SPAC known at the time of the IPO.
In Table 9 we find statistically significant results concerning mainly three variables: the 
percentage of funds placed in the trust fund (INTRUST), the expected dilution from original 
shareholders’ shares (DILUTION) and the deferred underwriter’s fee (UWFEEDEF). We see 
that all the three variables are included in models (16) and (20), i.e. they are characteristics 
investors can evaluate prior to subscribing shares in the IPO.
INTRUST is positive with coefficients ranging from 2.759 to 3.862. This result strongly 
suggests that INTRUST works as a proxy to SPAC quality. Although it should be noted that 
current market convention has INTRUST converging to 100 %. The coefficients for 
INTRUST in the extended (-1, +20) window are also positive with values over 3.00 and are 
statistically significant at 5 % and 1 % for models (18) and (20) respectively. This supports 
the quality proxy suggestion as the direct relevance of the INTRUST to investors disappears 
when the merger is completed at t = 0 as the investor no longer has the option to convert her 
shares to a cash.
UWFEEDEF has very large negative coefficients, which are statistically significant at 1 % 
level in models (14), (16), (18) and (20) and at 10 % level in models (13) and (17). In 
addition, the coefficients in the models for the (-1, +20) period are almost double to those in 
(-5, +5). This result is very interesting and has two explanations. First explanation is that 
investors perceive the deferred fee as a contingent liability, which causes a discount in the 
value of the SPAC. However, this theory fails to explain why the effect is even stronger when 
the window is extended beyond the event date. A possible explanation is given by Rau 
(2000), who suggests that contingent fees in M&As may cause an agency problem between
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shareholders and deal advisors. This effect is emphasized by the fact that Rau finds banks 
accepting contingent fees to be more prestigious and wielding more market power. This 
enables top-tier banks to accept contingent fees as they are confident in their resources and 
ability to bring a merger to a conclusion. In SPACs this may result in poorer acquisition 
targets being presented to investors as more lucrative with the collaboration of the 
underwriter and the management team. With the recent evidence from Bodnaruk et al. (2007) 
regarding investment banks behaviour in M&As we certainly cannot rule this explanation 
out.
The coefficient for DILUTION is negative, but significantly smaller than UWFEEDEF. This 
is rather compelling as the measured effect of the expected dilution on the SPACs value at t = 
0 is a depreciation of approximately 20 %. For a possible explanation we return to the 
literature on closed-end funds and especially the event of converting to open-ending 
structure. As discussed in section 2.4.3, on open-ending, closed-end fund discounts disappear 
by share rising to converge with NAV of the vehicle. A similar phenomenon may explain 
why, instead of a dominating 20 % decrease that implies huge negative coefficients for 
DILUTION we see modest figures between -1.876 and -2.032. The rationale of this proposed 
explanation is that, unlike closed-end funds that trade at a discount, SPACs could be valued 
at a “hidden premium” or goodwill due to positive expectations. This premium is countered 
by the larger negative effect from the expected dilution. However, the dilution effect is 
restricted in pre-merger trading to the NAV (represented by the trust fund assets) less any 
liquidity discounts. At merger completion the restriction is lifted and, the dilution takes full 
effect, but now also the premium which earlier was “buried” under the expected dilution 
effects the SPAC value and the fixed minimum value guaranteed by the assets in the trust 
fund. Two effects combine for a negative net effect much smaller than that represented by the 
expected dilution alone.
Further results from the merger completion event show that size of the SPAC plays little role 
in determining the abnormal returns, although we find a negative coefficient statistically 
significant at 5 % level in model (14). The risk-free interest rate carries a large positive 
coefficient, although not statistically significant. This contradicts the hypotheses of low 
interest rates being beneficial for SPACs. Part of the explanation may arise from the 
competition from private equity leveraged buyout (LBO) funds that are shown to be sensitive 
to interest rate fluctuations. Higher interest rates drive LBO funds from the market, thus
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opening up the competition for more advantageous operating environment for SPACs. Tim 
until liquidation seems to be a negligible factor in all models, as is the case with used 
leverage, using stock as payment and industry focus. Although none of these results are 
statistically significant they suggest rejecting hypotheses H3, H4, H6 and H7.
Table 11. Regression analysis results for merger completion
Regression models for the determination of CARs in selected event windows are presented. Models (13) and (17) include all variables. 
Models (14) and (18) are formulated by removing one variable at a time from the all variables models in the order of highest p-value. From 
the results the model with the highest adjusted R2 is then selected. Models (15) and (19) include variables directly relevant to earlier 
literature. Models (16) and (20) include variables related to SPAC characteristics known at the time of the IPO. Table includes regression 
coefficients and t-stats for the independent variables in the model. T-stats are in parentheses. Possible statistical significance (p-value) is 
denoted with asterisks after the coefficient value. TIME is the relative amount of time left in the acquisition window at the time of merger 
agreement announcement. SIZE is the amount of IPO gross proceeds. LEVERAGE is the relative size of the acquired assets to SIZE. 
INTRUST is the percentage of IPO gross proceeds placed in a trust fund. DILUTION is the dilution coming to effect at merger completion 
due to management owned shares. RISKFREE is the 3-month T-bills rate. INDUSTRY is a dummy variable with the value 1 if SPAC 
focuses on certain industry or industries and is 0 otherwise. UWFEE is the total underwriter’s fee (%) in the SPAC IPO. UWFEEDEF is the 
underwriter’s fee (%) that is paid only upon the completion of a merger. PAYMETHOD is a dummy variable with the value 1 if stock is 
used as a payment method in the merger and is 0 otherwise..
Dependent variable: CARS (-5, +5) CARS (-1, +20)
Independent variable
Expected
sign (13) (14) (15)
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(Constant) -2.261 -2.171 -0.081 -2,051*** -3.213 -2.330* -0.147 -3.237**
(-1.831) (-1.831) (-0.42) (-3.097) (-1.226) (-1.806) (-0.413) (-2.448)
LEVERAGE + -0.008 -0.023 -0.016 -0.044
(-0.246) (-0.675) (-0.221) (-0.694)
INTRUST + 3.649** 3.775*** 2.759*** 4.803 3.092** 3.862***
(2.65) (4.224) (4.177) (1.644) (2.226) (2.927)
DILUTION - -0.314 -0.852** -1.141 -2.032** -1.876**
(-0.381) (-2.366) (-0.651) (-2.206) (-2.607)
RISKFREE - 5.087 4.211 2.644 6.448 4.445
(1.236) (1.672) (0.687) (0.738) (0.626)
FOCUS + -0.017 0.029 -0.041 0.031
(-0.167) (0,670) (-0.191) (0.352)
UWFEE + 1.567 2.142 2.520* 0.844 2.688
(0.513) (1.164) (1.764) (0.13) (0.942)
UWFEEDEF - -8.185* -8.383*** -7.498*** -15.292* -14.087*** -14.986***
(-2.293) (-3.334) (■4.520) (-2.019) (-3.241) (-4.523)
PAYMETHOD + 0.061 -0.044 0.002 -0.179
(0.597) (-0.413) (0.008) (-0.912)
TRADEVOL - 0.765 0.848 -0.259 1.067 -0.454
(0.886) (1.443) (-0.423) (0.582) (-0.401)
LN SIZE - -0.116 -0.143** -0.039 -0.101 -0.003
(-1.288) (-2.552) (-1.288) (-0.528) (-0.520)
TIME + -0.071 -0.230
(-0.276) (-0.421)
F-stat 1.463 3.779 0.345 7.584 0.993 5.619 0.508 6.110
Slg. 0.301 0.021 0.844 <0.001 0.518 0.008 0.731 <0,001
R2 0.817 0.636 0.084 0.580 0.577 0.513 0.119 0.526
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.467 -0.160 0.503 -0.004 0.422 -0.116 0.440
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6.4. Trading volume analysis
The liquidity of SPACs is very limited. As seen earlier in Table 2, the average trading 
volumes of SPACs are very low. Table 10 presents the trading volumes relative to the 
SPAC’s market capitalization around the merger completion event.
First, we see that for all periods presented, starting from Day -70, the mean volumes are all 
clearly higher than the benchmark volume set in the (-70, -20) window before the merger 
announcement. All results in Table В are statistically significant at 1 % level.
Table 12. Trading volumes at merger completion
The table reports the mean, minimum and maximum trading volumes during the merger completion 
event in different event windows relative to the benchmark mean level of 100% measured in (-70, - 
21) before the merger announcement event. Also t-statistic and statistical significance (p-value) is
Window Mean Sig- Min Max
(-70, -20) 355.65 %
(3.399)
0.002 -97.32 % 4001.70 %
(-20, -1) 513.11 %
(4.641)
< 0.001 -96.49 % 2582.53 %
C-1,+1) 962.94 %
(3.743)
0.001 -100.00 % 6070.38 %
(-5, +5) 706.60 % 
(4.568)
<0.001 -98.94 % 3882.26 %
(-1, +20) 498.85 % 
(2.967)
0.005 -98.77 % 5144.47%
(-1, +70) 301.82 %
(2.895)
0.006 -93.46 % 2858.69 %
The trading volumes peak at 962.94 % in (-1, +1), but level down to 301.82 % in (-1, +70). 
This evidence supports the notion that the completion of a merger does not result in a 
immediate increase of trading activity. Therefore we are inclined to accept H9.
The average trading volumes in (-20, +20) window at the merger completion announcement 
event are depicted in Figure 7, which allows for visual confirmation that the trading volumes 
do not experience a persisting increase after the event date.
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Figure 7. Trading volumes
Figure reports the mean relative trading volumes. The line represents the trading volume relative to the normal trading volume of 100 /о 
measured in (-70, -21) before the merger announcement event. The area represents the trading volume relative to the market capitalization of 
the SPAC. The x-axis is the day relative to the merger completion date. The left-hand side у-axis is the trading volume relative to the SPAC 








7. Summary and conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to examine a new investment class - the Special Purpose 
Acquisition Company - from the investor’s perspective and be first to document issues 
relevant to those investing in SPACs. This goal was summarized in and studied through two 
research problems:
1. Do abnormal returns for SPAC shareholders exist
a. During a merger announcement?
b. During a merger completion?
II Which SPAC characteristics drive the share price performance and how relevant 
are they in explaining returns to SPAC shareholders
Consequently, the thesis starts by giving an overview of SPACs including a brief history 
review, summary of relevant legislation and a description of the mechanics of a SPAC from 
the IPO until the eventual merger or liquidation. Next, a review of relevant literature is 
presented. As no earlier studies on SPACs or blank check companies have been published, 
this section aims to establish an understanding of what areas relevant to SPACs have been 
studied and what the results have been. An emphasis is put on the implications on the 
feasibility of SPAC as an investment vehicle. Based on a combination of theory and SPAC’s 
novel features, a set of eleven hypotheses were formulated to meet the objective of this study. 
In the empirical part of the thesis the hypotheses were tested and the results reported. Finally 
this section concludes the study.
First I briefly present the data used in this thesis and then move to discuss the results and 
contribution of the study. The empirical results are summarized in Table 12 in sub-section
7.3. Finally, sub-section 7.4 reviews ideas and suggestions for further research.
This thesis employs a data sample of 152 SPACs issued between 2003 and February, 2008. 
However, the number of sample companies studied in the events was only 72 and 38 for the 
merger agreement announcement and the merger completion announcement respectively. 
This is due to the fact that only 72 companies in the sample had announced a merger 
agreement. Of those 72 only 38 had completed a merger while 10 were liquidated. The data
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sample is obviously small, which is reflected in a lack of statistical significance in the results. 
For certain parts of the regression analysis less data was available for the sample, hence 
slightly varying sample sizes. The share price data, market index data and the interest rate 
data was collected from Thomson Datastream database. All other information was manually 
gathered from the company filings in the SEC Edgar database.
7.1. Evidence on abnormal returns during merger announcement
The first hypothesis studied through the event study methodology is HI which proposed that 
the abnormal returns in the merger announcement window are higher for the SPACs that 
eventually completed a merger than for the whole sample. The results clearly support this 
hypothesis although the differences are small. In window (-20, +20) the mean CARs of the 
whole sample and completed mergers are 2.41 % and 5.02 % respectively. However, the 
value for the completed mergers subsample barely escapes statistical significance. 
Statistically significant results arise in the (-5, +5) window where the mean CAR for the 
whole sample is 2.19 % and statistically significant at 5 % level while completed mergers 
subsample yields CAR of 3.28 % with a statistical significance of 10 %. Based on the 
evidence we can accept HI.
The second hypothesis studied through the event study methodology is H8a, which proposes 
that the abnormal returns start to accumulate before the announcement date. The data support 
also this hypothesis, but the lack of statistically significant results denies drawing final 
conclusions and accepting H8a. However, the data suggest that the abnormal returns start to 
accumulate approximately two weeks prior to the event and do not follow the typical format 
expected from market reactions to news.
Moving to the results from the regression analysis, the first hypothesis for the merger 
announcement studied through regression models proposed is H3a, which states that the 
abnormal returns are positively correlated with the cost of debt. However, results are 
contradicting if anything. The results show that the relation is positive, but lack of statistical 
significance again restricts further conclusions. However, the evidence suggests rejecting 
H3a. The possible positive relation may be an indirect result of decreased competition from 
LBO funds at times of higher cost of debt, which could be stronger than the effect of high
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cost of debt driving higher quality companies to go through an IPO themselves as suggested 
by Bayar and Chemmanur (2006) in their unpublished working paper.
In H5a I hypothesized that the abnormal returns are negatively correlated with the average 
trading volume of SPACs due to the illiquidity discount phenomenon documented in several 
studies (Amihud and Mendelson, 1989; Amihud, 2002; Lemer and Schoar, 2004). Results 
support this notion, but are not statistically significant.
Next, in H6a I, inspired by the findings of Gompers and Lemer (2006) in the venture capital 
environment, hypothesized that the abnormal returns are negatively correlated with SPAC 
size. However, the results do not support this notion; the coefficients are close to zero and not 
statistically significant. Thus, we have grounds to believe that SPAC size is irrelevant to the 
returns in the merger announcement event.
Moving to H7a we found the coefficient for the time left in the acquisition window at the 
time of the merger announcement to be small and positive, but not statistically significant. 
This could be due to the existence of a small agency problem effect between management 
and shareholders.
7.1.1. Evidence on abnormal returns during merger completion
The only hypothesis analyzed with event study methodology yielded poor results. In H8 I 
proposed that the abnormal returns start to accumulate before the event date. In the case of 
merger completion event we cannot accept the hypothesis as the data shows anomalous 
behaviour just before the event date.
In the regression analysis we found some interesting results. The most interesting results 
obviously emerged outside my set of hypothesis. The unexpectedly small negative coefficient 
for the expected dilution from the original shareholder’s shares raised questions regarding the 
valuation and share price behaviour of SPACs. However, the explanations for this 
phenomenon are beyond the scope of this study and are left for future research. Returning to 
the hypotheses, the following results were found in the regression analysis:
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First, I hypothesized in H3b that the abnormal returns are negatively correlated with the cost 
of debt. Although the results are not statistically significant we observed moderately high 
coefficients for the variable, which suggests that the sign of the coefficient is at least positive. 
We can therefore reject H3b as already implied by the results from the merger announcement.
Next, I hypothesized in H4 that using stocks as payment in the merger leads to higher 
abnormal returns in as reported by Chang (1998) in his study of acquisitions of private 
targets. However, the evidence is inconclusive and does not allow accepting H4.
In H5b I hypothesized that, consistent with the liquidity discount hypothesis, the normal 
trading volume of SPACs is negatively correlated with the abnormal returns. The evidence 
from the merger completion is inconsistent with changing coefficient signs. Based on the 
results we have no grounds to accept H5b.
Then, in H6b the hypothesis presented was that the SPAC size is negatively correlated with 
the abnormal returns. Statistical significance was found only in one regression model, but the 
coefficient was consistently negative leading us to believe in the existence of a weak negative 
correlation between the abnormal returns and SPAC size.
Time left in the acquisition window at the time of merger announcement was addressed in 
H7b, where I hypothesized that it is negatively correlated with the abnormal returns. 
However, the results are marginal and do not support accepting the hypothesis.
Next, in HIO I hypothesized that an agency problem may arise from the deferred 
underwriter’s fee and that the size of the deferred fee is negatively correlated with the 
abnormal returns. The evidence is strong. The coefficient was found to be large and negative 
throughout the regression models and statistically significant at 1 % level in most regression 
models. This is the most important result of the study. The implications of the result should 
be viewed from the context presented by Rau (2000), who proposes that banks may behave 
opportunistically in the presence of contingent fees. This implies that underwriters could be 
able to affect the merger completion process and get targets of lesser quality approved by the 
shareholders. The fact that the coefficient for the deferred fee is much lower in the extended 
(-1, +20) event window supports the presented idea. Investors could over time realize that the
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value of the target company is actually worse than initially perceived. The contingent liability 
effect of the deferred fee should remain constant over time.
Finally, in HI lb I hypothesized that the percentage of IPO proceeds placed in trust fund acts 
as a proxy to SPAC quality and is positively correlated with the abnormal results. The results 
support this view with strong statistical significance and positive coefficients. Especially the 
results in the extended (-1, +20) event window support this view as the actual effect of the 
trust fund has disappeared, yet the results show coefficients slightly higher than in the (-5, 
+5) window.
7.2. Main findings and contribution
The main findings are also the from the study are the negative returns in the post-merger 
period, which reach -4.33 % and -12.84 % for holding periods of 20 and 70 days respectively. 
However, this assumes that investor does not convert her shares when facing a poor merger 
proposal. Sophisticated and active investors should be able to greatly improve on the mean 
returns found in this study.
The regression analysis revealed the likely existence of an agency problem between SPAC 
shareholders and the IPO underwriters which overshadows the superficial problem of dilution 
from management’s shares at the time of the merger completion. However, the understated 
effect of the dilution raised a question regarding the valuation of SPACs. Applying the 
framework from research on closed-end funds allows hypothesizing on the dynamic of how 
the markets value SPACs, but further research is necessary to understand this aspect of 
SPACs.
The key contribution of this thesis is to provide first empirical evidence on SPAC as an asset 
class and most importantly lay ground for future research. This thesis clearly shows that the 
future research should be focused on the merger completion event instead of the merger 
announcement, which does not appear to be considered as significant news.
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Table 13. Summary of hypotheses and results
The table presents the hypotheses of the study and the methods used to analyze them along with the results. In the method column ES 
denotes event study. REG, denotes ordinary least squares regression and SA denotes separate analysis.
Hypothesis Method Result
HI
Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event for the sample, 
of completed mergers are higher than for the whole sample
ES Moderate evidence
H2
Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are positively, 
correlated with the level of debt used in the transaction.
REG No evidence
H3a
Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively, 





Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are negatively, 





Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement are higher for deals, 
that use stock as payment.
REG No evidence
HSa
Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively, 
correlated with daily trading volume
REG Weak evidence
H5b
Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are negatively, 
correlated with daily trading volume
REG No evidence
H6a
Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are negatively, 
correlated with the SPAC IPO gross proceeds
REG No evidence
H6b
Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are negatively, 
correlated with the SPAC IPO gross proceeds
REG Very weak evidence
H7a
Abnormal returns in the merger agreement announcement event are positively, 
correlated with the time left in the acquisition window.
REG Weak evidence
H7b
Abnormal returns in the merger completion announcement event are positively 
correlated with the time left in the acquisition window.
REG No evidence
H8a




Pre-announcement abnormal returns start to accumulate prior to the merger 
completion announcement.
ES No evidence
H9 Trading volumes do not increase immediately after a merger is completed. SA Strong evidence
H10
Abnormal returns in the merger completion event are negatively correlated with, 
the size of the deferred underwriter's fee
REG Strong evidence
Hila
Abnormal returns in the merger announcement event are positively correlated with the 
amount of IPO proceeds placed in trust fund.
REG No evidence
Hllb
Abnormal returns in the merger completion event are positively correlated with the 
amount of IPO proceeds placed in trust fund.
REG Strong evidence
7.3. Suggestions for further research
The topic of SPACs has barely been scratched with this thesis, but the ground has been laid 
for further studies. I have categorized possible themes for further research into three different 
categories; (i) valuation, (ii) deal characteristics and (iii) investor behaviour.
7.3.1. Valuation
SPAC valuation shares similarities with closed-end fund valuation, which has puzzled 
academics for a long time. Now that a consensus on closed-end funds is starting to form, 
SPACs present a new challenge to tackle.
67
In section 6.3.2 I presented a explorative theory on why SPAC share prices behave as they do 
at the merger completion. Especially the dynamic between a potential goodwill or premium 
and the dilution from original shareholder’s shares is an interesting question. Unlike in 
closed-end funds, a major challenge arises from the existence of the conversion option which 
restricts the share price movement prior to the merger. Also the role and size of the perceived 
liquidity discount warrants a closer examination.
Relating to the topic of SPAC valuation is the examination of SPAC portfolio construction. 
Can efficient portfolios be constructed with SPACs? What are the implications for portfolio 
managers? Is it feasible to value the merger proposals with great detail to improve decision­
making in the shareholder vote?
Final topic related to SPAC valuation is the understanding of the logic of the unit offering 
and management’s commitment to purchasing warrants in a private placement. An especially 
intriguing question is that can a target company benefit from the outstanding warrants and if 
so, under what circumstances?
7.3.2. Deal characteristics
Focusing on SPAC characteristics, this study almost completely ignored the characteristics of 
the merger. An examination of target companies and more careful dissection of the deal 
parameters may reveal new avenues in understanding SPACs.
Partially belonging under this topic is also the role of the underwriter in all phases of a 
SPAC’s life cycle. Evidence from this study suggests that a critical review of underwriter’s 
role in the spirit of Bodnaruk et al. (2007) may yield interesting results.
7.3.3. Investor behaviour
Considering the dismal share price development after the merger as documented in this study 
we are left with the question of why do investors approve deals that destroy shareholder 
value? The question is especially intriguing when they have a clear walkaway position with 
minimal losses. Understanding this aspect also yields a more comprehensive picture on
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SPACs as an asset class as it may answer the bottom question of why there is demand for 
SPACs. In addition, a study where a portfolio of SPACs is constructed could show if such 
portfolio is able to yield positive returns.
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